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The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its
Implications for New Textualist Statutory
Interpretation
STEPHEN F. RosS AND DANIEL TRANEN*
The "New Textualist" movement in statutory interpretation seeks to exclude
from judicial consideration what could be termed extrinsic evidence of legisla-
tive intent. The primary source of this extrinsic evidence is a statute's legislative
history, such as committee reports, floor debates, sponsor statements, and other
indicia of legislative intent not included in the text of the statute.] New
Textualists reject the notion that judges should seek out the statute's intended
meaning from these sources. Rather, they believe that judges should give the
statute the meaning that would be attached to the textual language by an
ordinary speaker of English. 2 The movement's best-known advocate, Justice
Antonin Scalia, has clearly stated that the most prominent and practical reason
for textualism is that "under the guise or even the self-delusion of perusing
unexpressed legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue their
own objectives and desires.",3 Scalia concludes that on balance the use of
legislative history "has facilitated rather than deterred decisions that are based
upon the courts' policy preferences, rather than neutral principles of law.",
4
Although there are other, more formalist arguments in favor of textualism,
5
Justice Scalia makes clear that even these ostensibly formalist arguments are
really functional, for they serve to ensure a "government of laws, not of men,"
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois; B.A., J.D., University of California (Berkeley). Associate,
Goldstein and Price, L.C. (St. Louis); B.A., University of Pennsylvania, J.D., University of Illinois,
respectively. The authors wish to thank Professors Ian Ayres, James Brudney, William Eskridge, Jr.,
Daniel Farber, Kit Kinports, Russell Korobkin, Peter Maggs, John Nagel, William Popkin, Marie
Reilly, Richard Speidel, and Peter Strauss and Judges Alex Kozinski and Patricia Wald for extremely
valuable comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. Valuable assistance, of course, does not
necessarily signal agreement.
1. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION (1997); William N. Eskridge Jr., The
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990). Eskridge's article publicly coined the term.
2. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 17-18. The key to New Textualism is not its rigid insistence on text-based
interpretation. Indeed, as detailed below in text accompanying notes 138-53, New Textualists use a host
of presumptions and engage in a "holistic textualism." See WwLLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 41-47 (1994). Rather, what distinguishes New Textualism is its rigid
insistence on an "objective" interpretation, which, as we suggest in this article, is objective only in the
sense that it rejects the relevance of the objective manifestations of the subjective intent of the statute's
drafters as an integral part of the interpretive process.
4. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 35.
5. The formalist argument is that legislative history has not been passed by both houses of Congress
and presented to the President, and it is therefore unconstitutional to give it legal effect. See, e.g., In re
Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343-44 (7th Cir. 1989); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation
Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 673 (1997). We discuss this at infra text accompanying notes 169-78.
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
by reducing judicial discretion.6
The claim that judicial discretion is constrained by textualism but facilitated
by the use of extrinsic interpretive aids such as legislative history is highly
contested. For example, two well-known commentators whose backgrounds
include extensive legislative experience-Judge Abner Mikva and Professor
Eric Lane-completely disagree with Justice Scalia on this fundamental point.
As Mikva and Lane observe, when legislative history is excluded, the remaining
interpretive tools available to a judge "effectively permit unfettered discre-
tion.",7 Some support for Mikva's and Lane's argument can be gleaned from the
candid opinions of commentators whose principal focus is not statutory interpre-
tation. Senator Orrin Hatch, a conservative who rails against left-wing "judicial
activism," has endorsed reliable forms of legislative history because these
references can serve as "additional strands to tie judges to the law itself,"
notwithstanding the risk of manipulation.8 On the other hand, support for
Scalia's legisprudential goal of textualism comes candidly from a leading
advocate of an activist jurisprudence that Scalia purports to abhor. Professor
Jerry Mashaw, who expresses sympathy for the view that judges should inter-
pret statutes not as a faithful agent for the legislature that actually voted on the
legislation, but rather as an agent for an idealized body cured of "republican
legislative malfunctions," has commended New Textualism and criticized authori-
tative reliance on legislative history.9 According to Mashaw, "the exclusion of
legislative history is more likely to increase the flexibility of statutes than to
render them static or rigid."'o When Mashaw speaks of "flexibility," he of
course means flexibility in the hands of the interpreting judge.
When judges do not use extrinsic aids, what are the consequences, in terms of
the extent of judicial power, the influence of a judge's personal perspective on
the case, and the drafters' ability to effectuate their own policy preferences
through agreement on a text? Justice Scalia and his followers are not the first to
advocate the exclusion of these proffered indicia of the writers' intent. Approxi-
mately half a century ago, virtually the same arguments were made by Professor
Samuel Williston and other defenders of the First Restatement of Contracts,
who sharply criticized the admissibility of parol evidence to assist judges and
juries in interpreting contracts. Like Scalia, Williston argued that judges should
6. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 25. Another leading textualist, Judge Frank Easterbrook, seems to
emphasize the formalist objection, although he too adds that textualism "cuts down the amount of
judicial discretion, for judges free to bend law to 'intents' that are invented more than they are
discovered become the real authors of the rule." Herrman v. Cencom Cable Assoc., 978 F.2d 978, 982
(7th Cir. 1992).
7. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 33 (1997).
8. Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Construction or Deconstruction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 43 (1988).
9. Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32
WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 836 (1991).
10. Jerry L. Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685, 1692-93 (1988).
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rely instead on the plain meaning of the text as understood by a "reasonable"
third party."
Williston's advocacy of a broad and exclusionary parol evidence rule was
sharply criticized by other leading contracts scholars, most notably Professor
Arthur Corbin. Corbin rejected the notion that extrinsic evidence would taint the
reliability of interpretation by giving judges or juries free rein to reach results
they felt were desirable, even if such results were not faithful to the terms of the
contract. Indeed, the opposite result was more likely. As Corbin argued:
when a judge refuses to consider relevant extrinsic evidence on the ground
that the meaning of written words is to him plain and clear, his decision is
formed by and wholly based upon the completely extrinsic evidence of his
own personal education and experience.12
Corbin's view that extrinsic evidence reduces the influence of a judge's personal
biases, and thus results in a more accurate interpretation of the words written by
the drafters, has been widely accepted in contract law. Both the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts reflect that
11. Williston candidly recognized that, when interpreting a contract, "it is not the intention of the
parties that is material, but the meaning that the court gives to their manifestations." 3 SAMUEL
WILLISTON & GEORGE G. THOMPSON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 603, at 1731 (rev. ed. 1936)
[hereinafter WILLISTON]. The appropriate standard for most contracts, he concluded, is that of "reason-
able expectation, which would attach to words or other manifestations of intention the meaning which
the party employing them should reasonably have apprehended that they would convey to the other
party." Id. at 1732. As his editorial successor explained:
As applied to contracts and agreements, interpretation is the process of determining from the
expressions of the parties what external acts must happen or be performed in order to
conform to what the law considers their will. But it is pertinent to note at the outset that if the
parties [have a written contract], the law does not recognize their will, or, as it is more
frequently stated, their intent, unless it is expressed in, or may be fairly implied from, their
writing.
4 WALTER H. E. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CoNTRACTs § 600A, at 286 (3d ed. 1961) [hereinafter
JAEGERIWILLISTON].
This position has recently been echoed in Trident Center v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.,
847 E2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1988). Bound under Erie to apply the prevailing California law that freely
admits parol evidence (see infra text accompanying notes 36-37) to a contract case that appeared in
federal court because of diversity, the court reversed a district court judgment that had excluded such
evidence, but not before the opinion's author, Judge Alex Kozinski, openly questioned the wisdom of
California's approach:
If [parol] evidence raises the specter of ambiguity where there was none before, the contract
language is displaced and the intention of the parties must be divined from self-serving
testimony offered by partisan witnesses whose recollection is hazy from passage of time and
colored by their conflicting interests. We question whether this approach is more likely to
divulge the original intention of the parties than reliance on the seemingly clear words they
agreed upon at the time.
Trident, 847 F.2d at 569.
12. Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parole Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q.
161, 164 (1965).
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view. 13
Our principal argument focuses on the applicability of key aspects of the
anti-Willistonian critique of objectivity to statutory interpretation. Specifically,
we suggest that, in both free markets and free countries, the effective drafting of
documents is facilitated when judges seek-subject to justifiable exceptions-to
effectuate the parties' intent; 4 that the rejection of extrinsic aids inevitably
increases rather than decreases the ability of judges to effectuate their own
personal preferences at the expense of those of the documents' drafters; and that
excluding extrinsic evidence results in a shift of power from private parties or
legislators (as the case may be) to judges.
We do not suggest, of course, that the jurisprudence of interpretation should
be identical without regard to the text involved. An analysis of the differences
between drafting and interpretation in the contract and statutory contexts,
however, suggests that the case for the conventional practice of considering
legislative history absent a clear manifestation of legislative intent to the
contrary is even stronger than the case for admitting parol evidence absent a
similar manifestation of contrary intent by the contracting parties. 15
13. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTs 471 (1990); Robert Braucher, Interpretation and Legal
Effect in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 13, 14 (1981) (indicating most
significant change from original Restatement "is an increased emphasis on the context in which a
contract is made and on the meanings attached by the parties to their words and conduct"). Ironically,
Justice Braucher, writing just before the onset of New Textualism, suggested that the outmoded
textualist techniques of the original Restatement reminded him of the plain meaning rule, which he
characterized as "now largely discarded in the realm of statutory interpretation." Id.
Corbin's view is also reflected in Article 8(3) of the Convention on the International Sale of Goods,
which provides that negotiations are to be considered in interpreting international commercial agree-
ments unless the parties agree otherwise. See John F. Murray, Jr., An Essay on the Formation of
Contracts and Related Matters Under the United Nations Convention of Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, 8 J.L. & CoM. 11,44 (1988) (stating that the CISG rejects parol evidence rule).
14. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Expression Rules in Contract Law and Problems of Offer and
Acceptance, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1127, 1127 (1994) (arguing that major goal of contract law "is to facilitate
the power of self-governing parties to further their shared objectives"). See also James M. Landis, A
Note on "Statutory Interpretation", 43 HARv. L. REv. 886, 886 (1930):
The Anglo-American scheme of government conceives of lawgivers apart from and at times
paramount over courts. Such a function, commonly vested in a legislature, presupposes an
intelligible method of making known to the organs of administration, courts or otherwise, its
desires and hopes. That method centuries ago crystallized into the formalism of passing
statutes..It is from such a conception that one derives the rule of statutory interpretation
emphasizing the intent of the passer of statutes.
15. This article is solely concerned about the wholesale attack on the use of legislative history as an
objective manifestation of legislative intent. Just as Professor Corbin recognized that judges should
admit, but then reject as unconvincing, unreliable parol evidence, see 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CoNTRAcrs § 583, at 465 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter CORBIN], we believe that judges must be sensitive
to the use and abuse of legislative history. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 7, at 33 (1997) ("[w]hat
seems in order is not the avoidance of legislative history but its careful use"); Stephen Breyer, On the
Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845, 847 (1992) (arguing
textualists should "claim victory once they have made judges more sensitive to problems of the abuse
of legislative history; they ought not to condemn its use altogether.").
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To be sure, recognition of the strong analogy between contract and statutory
interpretation does not provide a complete response to New Textualists, but the
analogy does significantly call into question two of the more popular textualist
arguments: that textualism promotes a more objective and reliable interpretive
regime, and that textualism lessens the ability of unelected judges to frustrate
the policy preferences of the legislature. 16
Part I of this article focuses on the history of parol evidence in contract
interpretation, describing both Williston's and Corbin's definition and applica-
tion of the parol evidence rule. With the adoption of the UCC and the Second
Restatement, we suggest that Corbin's position-that expansion of admissibility
of parol evidence will more accurately reflect the drafters' manifest intentions
and minimize the judge's personal biases-has been accepted by experts and
legislators alike. In Part II, we summarize the use of legislative history in
statutory interpretation, focusing on the rise of the New Textualism and its
critique of the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation. Our analysis
reveals that interpretation based on a judge's view of a text's "ordinary mean-
ing" combined with the use of interpretive canons does not seriously constrain
judicial discretion. Part III compares and contrasts the use of parol evidence in
contract interpretation with the use of legislative history in statutory interpreta-
tion. We identify differences that actually strengthen the argument for extrinsic
aids as a means of limiting the effects of judicial bias in statutory interpretation,
and differences that do not affect the strong analogy between contract and
statutory interpretation; we then conclude with a response to formalist objec-
tions to the use of legislative history.
I. EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IN CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
A revolution in the use of parol evidence in interpreting contracts occurred
nearly fifty years ago. Professor Samuel Williston, the principal drafter of the
Restatement (First) of Contracts and the Uniform Sales Act, believed that
contracts should be interpreted in much the same manner as the New Textualists
interpret statutes today. Williston argued that parol evidence-evidence of
16. This article does not address the normative claim that judges should interpret contracts to further
their own vision of an efficient marketplace, or an equitable marketplace, or some combination of the
two; nor do we address the normative claim that judges should interpret statutes to further their own
vision of a just society. We would suggest, however, that arguments for judicial activism are best made
and effectuated openly, and on their own merits. For example, if contract law ought to protect
unsophisticated consumers from wealthy and sophisticated corporate manufacturers, we suggest the
preferred course is a substantive contract rule that insists upon minimum standards of the merchantabil-
ity of goods, rather than interpreting particular contract terms in a manner designed to achieve these
results while claiming to be simply interpreting the meaning of the text. Similarly, whether statutes
should be interpreted to protect state prerogatives in our federal system, or instead construed to protect
the interests of disadvantaged and politically powerless citizens, the preferred course is to explicitly
create presumptions in favor of these interpretations, rather than have these judicial biases seep into a
purported effort to give meaning to the "four corners" of a text. cf McNollgast, Positive Canons: The
Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 739 (1992).
1998]
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contemporaneous agreements and negotiations about the contract and the mean-
ing of its terms, including evidence of trade usage and other gap-fillers-should
not be admissible to explain the parties' intentions or to vary or contradict the
plain meaning of the agreement (unless, in the judge's view, a reasonable person
would view the writing, on its face; to be ambiguous or incomplete). As contract
and commercial law doctrines were being re-examined by the American Law
Institute and the uniform law movement, this view on the proper use and
admissibility of parol evidence was replaced by the views of Arthur Corbin,
Karl Llewellyn, and other scholars who advocated that parol evidence be
admitted so that a writing could be interpreted according to the actual intention
of the parties, notwithstanding the "objective" meaning that a judge might
attach to the words.' 7 This view has been adopted in the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, and the UCC, as well as by a number of jurisdictions. 
8
A. INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
ACCORDING TO WILLISTON
For Professor Williston, contract interpretation was a rigorous and mechani-
cal exercise in which a judge followed a hierarchy of rules. Although the judge
was nominally to follow the intent of the parties to the contract, 9 Williston
believed that the language of the contract was the only admissible evidence of
the parties' intent.20 In fact, he argued that the law did not recognize intent
unless memorialized in the agreement either expressly or impliedly.21 Conse-
quently, although Williston professed to follow the intent of the parties, a
contract under his view had nothing to do with the actual intent of the parties;
rather, it was an obligation attached by the force of law to a text agreed to by the
17. See Interform Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270, 1277 (9th Cir. 1978). The court noted that the
UCC's version of the parol evidence rule "reflects Corbin's influence," which is on "the intentions of
the parties and not the integration practices of reasonable persons acting normally and naturally," the
contrasting view advocated by Williston. The court concluded that the relevant law "being, in its
relevant parts, infused with Corbin's spirit, the trial judge in this case was acting within both its spirit
and letter when he admitted evidence extrinsic to the purchase orders to determine whether the
transaction was a sale or a lease." Id.
The modem view retains the traditional standard that parol evidence may not "vary or contradict"
the written contract. However, the reformist emphasis on the parties to the transaction, rather than the
judge's view of "reasonable" people, has resulted in a much narrower concept of what varies or
contradicts a text. Specifically, the modem view admits extrinsic evidence to demonstrate that the
parties attached a particular meaning to a textual term, even if the judge would otherwise believe the
term to have a different, unambiguous meaning. See U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 1(c) (stating that "[t]his
section definitely rejects .... [t]he requirement that a condition precedent to the admissibility of ...
[parol evidence] is an original determination by the court that the language used is ambiguous.").
Williston would, in these circumstances, conclude that the parol evidence "contradicted" the text.
18. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
19. See WILLISTON, supra note 11, §610. See also JAEGER WILLISTON, supra note 11, § 600, at
284-85.
20. See WILLISTON, supra note 11, § 610, at 1752.
21. See id. at 1755. The point is restated more clearly in JAEGER/WILLISTON, supra note 11, § 600A,
at 286.
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parties. In other words, Williston believed that the parties' written expression of
intent was, in most cases, the only relevant evidence of objective intent, and that
this limited conception of objective intent should govern the judicial enforce-
ment of contracts.22
According to Williston, the search for the intent of the parties required the
judge to follow the "common or normal meaning" of the agreement's text.
23
The presence or absence of ambiguity, therefore, was determined by looking at
the language; if the judge found the language unambiguous, the inquiry stopped.
Absent evidence of local usage or meaning, the judge, reading the contract as a
whole, need deploy nothing more than his own common sense regarding
24ordinary usage.
If, after employing these rules, the judge was still unsuccessful in discovering
which of the parties' alternative meanings ought to govern the contract, Willis-
ton called upon judges to use "secondary" canons of interpretation, which did
not inquire as to the actual intent of the parties, but instead reflected generaliza-
tions about the use of language and judicially-created normative views about
how contracts ought to be drafted.25 As we shall see, many of the primary and
secondary rules of contract interpretation bear a striking similarity to the
textualist canons of statutory construction.26 The Willistonian process thus
resulted in the judge rarely allowing evidence that the parties had actually
agreed to a particular meaning to affect his judgment that the words meant
something else.27
Williston's views on the parol evidence rule are reflected and explained in the
American Law Institute's Restatement (First) of Contracts. According to the
First Restatement, the standard for interpretation of a contract reflecting the
parties' complete bargain (an integration) is "the meaning that would be
22. See supra note 11. See also Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y.
1911) (Hand, J.); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 242 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963).
23. WILLISTON, supra note 11, § 618, at 1777.
24. See id. at 1777-80. See also, e.g., BBCI Inc. v. Canada Dry Del. Valley Bottling Co., 393 F
Supp. 299, 301 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (stating that "[t]he question of whether its provisions are ambiguous or
obscure on the one hand, or unambiguous and clear on the other hand, is a question of law for the
Judge"); Easton v. Washington County Ins. Co., 137 A.2d 332, 336 (Pa. 1957) (stating that only "after
the court is satisfied that a latent ambiguity exists is the question of what the parties intended by
language used in the contract-taking into consideration the extrinsic facts and circumstances-an
issue to be submitted to the jury").
25. WILLISTON, supra note 11, at 619-26. The secondary rules included such canons as: construe so
as not to conflict with the main purpose of the contract; pay attention to grammar and punctuation; the
specific governs the general; construe against the drafter; written matter trumps printed matter; and
prior clauses trump latter clauses. Williston also employed the interpretive maxim noscitur a sociis
(words should be given a meaning consistent with surrounding words), id. at 618, a technique common
to statutory interpretation as well. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
STATUTES 233-34 (1975). See also, e.g., Heathman v. Giles, 374 P.2d 839, 839 (Utah 1962) (holding
that statute covering "any sheriff, constable, peace officer, state road officer, or any other person
charged with the duty of enforcement of the criminal laws of this state" did not apply to prosecutor but
intended to cover only "badge-carrying officers" who were "in the front line of law enforcement").
26. See infra text accompanying notes 75-79.
27. See generally cases collected and criticized in CORaIN, supra note 15, at 542.
19981
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attached to the integration by a reasonably intelligent person acquainted with all
the operative usages and knowing all the circumstances prior to and contempora-
neous with the making of the integration, other than oral statements by the
parties of what they intended it to mean.",28 Again, as in Williston's treatise, the
actual meaning intended by the parties is irrelevant to the court and inadmis-
sible to the jury. The reading of the objective "reasonably intelligent person"
standard replaces the actual intent of the parties, even though that meaning may
not have been anticipated by one or both parties.29 In the end, extrinsic evidence
was admissible to aid the court in interpreting obscure words to which a
reasonably intelligent individual could not ascribe any plain meaning, but not
admissible to prove the actual intent of the parties.
B. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE UNDER CORBIN
Foreshadowing the debate between Justice Scalia and his critics, Professor
Arthur Corbin criticized the Williston approach for failing to accurately effectu-
ate the preferences of the contracting parties and for unduly favoring judges'
views on how "reasonable" contracts ought to look. Williston contended that
reference to parol evidence was inappropriate if a contract appeared to be
"integrated" (that is, to reflect a complete bargain between the parties) by virtue
of having all the necessary ingredients. Corbin rejected this approach. He
insisted that the document itself could not be used as the sole evidence of the
parties' intent to have the document represent their bargain, and that all relevant
evidence should be admitted when determining whether the agreement was an
integration. 30 This evidence is especially needed because determination of the
meaning of the text often will establish that the parties did not simply agree to
the words, but to the meaning of the words. In his view, flimsy and improbable
evidence as to whether a writing was integrated should be treated as flimsy and
improbable rather than automatically excluded from consideration.31
Critical to our analysis is Corbin's reliance on the manifest intent of the
actual parties, rather than a "reasonable person" standard, in interpreting con-
tracts. Williston feared that without the latter standard, parol evidence would be
admitted and the writing would be varied or contradicted. The two scholars
fundamentally disagreed about the relative reliability of a judge's ability to
interpret the four corners of a contract and the jury's ability to ascertain the
manifest intention of the parties from parol evidence. Williston feared that false
28. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF Cowracrs § 230 (1932) (emphasis added).
29. See id. at cmt. a. For examples of Williston's "reasonable person" approach, see Sietz v. Brewers
Refrig. Mach. Co., 141 U.S. 510, 517 (1891) (refusing to consider surrounding circumstances where
written contract was in all respects definite and unambiguous); Caputo v. Continental Constr Corp.,
162 N.E.2d 813, 815 (Mass. 1959) (considering surrounding circumstances in determining whether
writings in question state entire agreement); Danielson v. Bank of Scandinavia, 230 N.W. 83, 86 (Wis.
1930) (same); and Mitchell v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646, 647 (N.Y. 1928) (finding that a reasonable person
reading the contract would conclude that reciprocal obligations of parties were fully detailed).
30. See CORBIN, supra note 15, § 583, at 465.
31. See id. § 583, at 465.
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or unreliable parol evidence would mislead juries; Corbin believed that the
greater risk was that judges would be misled by their own background to
inaccurately attach a "plain meaning" to words when the parties intended no
such meaning. Corbin wrote:
Before holding that the words o f a written contract are so "plain and clear"
that extrinsic evidence in aid of interpretation is not admissible, the court's
attention should be called to the fact that in so holding it is substituting [its]
own linguistic education and experience for that of the contracting parties.
32
Once it was conceded that parties might attach a meaning to words that would
not coincide with a judge's view of the meaning a reasonable person would
attach to those same words, admission of extrinsic evidence would not change
the writing, as Williston believed. Rather, this evidence would help the inter-
preter understand the words' actual intended meaning. In other words, a jury
cannot change what isn't fixed.3 3 As a result, Corbin supported the introduction
of all relevant information to aid the court in the interpretation of contracts even
if the words were superficially unambiguous.3 4
Because, according to Corbin, the widespread use of parol evidence would
prevent judges from substituting their own biases for the meaning that the
parties understood each other to manifest when enacting and perfecting their
agreement, his approach would not necessarily threaten the integrity of the
written contract. The writing itself remains the best evidence of intent.3 5 Indeed,
because parol evidence more accurately reflects the parties' manifest intent than
32. CORBIN, supra note 15, § 542, at 111. See Meyers v. Selznick Co., 373 F.2d 218, 222 (2d Cir.
1966) (Friendly, J.) (noting "the courts' growing appreciation of Professor Corbin's lesson that words
are seldom so 'plain and clear' as to exclude proof of surrounding circumstances and other extrinsic
aids to interpretation"). As Corbin wrote, a judge will often be found to say that
"a court can not make a contract for the parties"; but when it holds the parties bound in
accordance with a meaning that seems "plain and clear" to the court and excludes convincing
evidence that the parties gave the words a different meaning, it is doing exactly what it can
not do: the court is making a contract for the parties that they did not themselves make.
CORBIN, supra note 15, § 542, at 111-12.
33. See id. § 579, at 421-22 (stating that "[s]uch testimony does not vary or contradict the written
words; it determines that which cannot be varied or contradicted"). Cf Breyer, supra note 15, at 863
(writing "[a] judge cannot interpret the words of an ambiguous statute without looking beyond its
words for the words have simply ceased to provide unequivocal guidance to decide the case at hand").
34. See CORBIN, supra note 15, at 414-20. See also Richard E. Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted
Terms and Contract Method, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 785, 789 (1982) (citing Arthur L. Corbin, Book
Review, 30 YALE L.J. 773 (1921) (reviewing SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920)));
Arthur L. Corbin, Book Review, 29 YALE L.J. 942 (1920) (reviewing SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF
CoNTRACTs (1920)) (Williston placed an excessive reliance on theory not responsive to the actual facts
in dispute). Cf United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) (stating that
"there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids" use of legislative history, "however clear the
[text] may appear on 'superficial examination' ").
35. Corbin suggests that the introduction of apparently contradictory parol evidence is not problem-
atic. He argues that the more bizarre and unusual the asserted interpretation, the more convincing must
be the testimony that supports it. See CORBN, supra note 15, at 420.
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the judge's "objective" review, Corbin's approach promotes the integrity of the
contract as a means of allowing parties the freedom to effectuate their economic
goals.36
36. The Williston/Corbin debate over integrity of the contract is illustrated by two famous cases that
exemplify opposing approaches. In Gianni v. R. Russel & Co., 126 A. 791 (Pa. 1924), an oral agreement
made contemporaneous to the writing was determined to be inadmissible because the court deemed the
writing a complete integration. The contract was a lease, which included clauses specifying which
products could and could not be sold by a tenant/vendor in the lessor's building. Gianni claimed to have
reached an oral understanding that in exchange for his agreement not to sell tobacco, the landlord
would give him exclusive rights to sell soft drinks in the building. When the landlord permitted another
tenant to violate the alleged exclusivity agreement, Gianni sued on the oral promise. Although Gianni
had a witness to the oral agreement, this testimony was declared to be inadmissible parol evidence, not
only in interpreting the contract, but also in ascertaining that the parties intended the written text to
reflect a complete integration of their agreement. This example illustrates how, according to the
traditional rule, evidence that a writing was not intended by the parties to be a fully integrated
agreement is inadmissible if the judge is comfortable with making a determination on the basis of the
writing alone. See also WILLISTON, supra note 11, § 633, at 1821 (stating that "the contract must appear
on its face to be incomplete in order to permit parol evidence of additional terms"); id. at 1822 (citing
Eighmie v. Taylor, 98 N.Y. 288, 294 (1885) (writing that there is little value to parol evidence rule if
extrinsic evidence admissible to show no intent for complete integration)).
In contrast, California Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Traynor held that rational interpretation
requires at least a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the
parties. See Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Brayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 645 (Cal.
1966). Thus, the court reversed the trial judge's decision that, because he found the contract to be
unambiguous, he would not consider parol evidence that the defendant's contractual promise to
"indemnify" the plaintiff against "all loss . . . arising out of or in any way connected with the
performance of this contract" was meant to cover only injury to third parties, and not to plaintiffs
property. According to both Corbin and Justice Traynor, a judge who relies on the "plain language" is
determining the meaning according to the judge's own education and experience. See id. at 643 (citing
CORBIN, supra note 15, § 579, at 225 n.56 (Supp. 1964)).
The facts in these cases illustrate the very point that Corbin and Justice Traynor were trying to make.
Consider the reliability of Williston's approach in the context of the Gianni case. How can we reconcile
the plaintiffs testimony about the separate oral agreement with the court's conclusion that reasonable
persons would have included such an agreement in the writing? Three possibilities present themselves.
One is that the plaintiff and his corroborating witness were lying. To justify the exclusion of the
evidence, of course, Willistonians would need to fear that juries would find for the plaintiff anyway. See
Charles T. McCormick, Parol Evidence Rule as a Practical Device for Control of the Jury, 41 YALE L.J.
365 (1932). Another possibility is that the defendant engaged in fraud (deliberately excluding a critical
element in a written contract with a less sophisticated party), but that such fraud is unprovable. Courts
have often found for the plaintiff in these circumstances, by making a finding of fraud in the
inducement, which is not subject to the parol evidence rule. See, e.g., Wilburn v. Steward, 794 P.2d
1197 (N.M. 1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS, § 214(d) & cmt c. But see McGuire v.
Schneider, Inc., 534 A.2d 115 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), affd, 548 A.2d 1123 (Pa. 1988) (refusing to admit
parol evidence regarding fraud in inducement of employment contract). Absent fraud, the last possibil-
ity is that the judges were wrong in concluding that reasonable people would necessarily include this
side agreement in a writing. Perhaps the parties were unfamiliar with the parol evidence rule. Perhaps,
not anticipating later litigation, it was too much trouble to memorialize the side agreement. Perhaps the
justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court were simply poorly informed as to ordinary business
practices. Whatever the truth, the opinion shows a result governed neither by the actual preferences of
voluntary parties to a contract nor neutral principles of law, but rather one dictated by judges
effectuating their own backgrounds and objectives.
Similarly, in the California case, despite the fact that the language at issue was "classic language for
a third party indemnity provision," the trial judge determined for himself that the plain meaning of the
language required the defendant to indemnify the plaintiff as well as third parties. Pacific Gas, 442 P.2d
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For our purposes, the critical aspect of the Williston-Corbin struggle is that
Corbin won.37 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts radically departed from
its predecessor's approach to plain meaning of contract text and to the admissibil-
ity of parol evidence, largely due to Corbin's influence. 38 As a result, under the
Second Restatement, extrinsic evidence that was excluded under the First
Restatement is available to fact finders who interpret contracts. 39 The American
Law Institute thus established Corbin's liberalized parol evidence rule as the
new standard for admissibility of extrinsic evidence in contract interpretation.
Perhaps the most dispositive evidence of Corbin's triumph is the substantial
adoption of his rule by state legislatures in the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC or the "Code"). Article 2 of the Code replaced the Uniform Sales Act,
which had been drafted chiefly by Williston, as the model law governing the
sale of goods. One of the many changes it makes is reflected in § 2-202, which
controls the admissibility of parol evidence in the sale of goods.4 ° In fact, the
chief purpose of that section was apparently to loosen the common law parol
evidence rule.4 1
at 642-43. A Willistonian might argue that the trial judge simply was a poor textualist, incorrectly
settling on an interpretation to which reasonable people would not subscribe. Corbin would disagree-
the judge's error in this case exemplifies why judges should not put on blinders. In so doing, they
inevitably limit themselves to the extrinsic evidence of their own background and experience, and are
thus likely to erroneously substitute their personal interpretation for that of the parties-the precise
claim that nontextualists like Judge Mikva make, in contradicting the New Textualists.
37. See Interform Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270, 1276 (9th Cir. 1978). Pacific Gas has since
become the rule of law in California and elsewhere. See, e.g., Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n,
902 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995); Taylor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 854 P.2d 1134 (Ariz.
1993); Berg v. Hudesman, 801 P.2d 222 (Wash. 1990); Isbraudtsen v. North Branch Corp., 556 A.2d 81
(Vt. 1988).
38. See Robert Braucher, Freedom of Contract and the Second Restatement, 78 YALE L.J. 598, 598
(1969).
39. While the First Restatement excluded evidence of the parties' intent in favor of the judge's view
of a reasonable third party, the Second Restatement allows the trier of fact to determine the credibility
of extrinsic evidence concerning the operative meaning of terms from the context of the transaction.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212. Unlike the First Restatement's reliance upon the judge's
view of the reasonable person to determine whether the writing is integrated, the Second Restatement
permits evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements and negotiations to establish the parties'
intent regarding the finality or completeness of their agreement, and to explain the meaning of the
writing. See id. at § 214 cmt. a (explaining that the determination of whether a contract is integrated
may be supplemented by extrinsic evidence pertaining to the meaning of the terms of the contract). See
also Speidel, supra note 34, at 798:
The Restatement Second's approach to contract interpretation rejects the view that words
have plain meanings, that the court should, as a matter of law, determine meaning from the
four corners of a writing, and that there are rules of interpretation or reasonable meanings
waiting "out there" for discovery and application [citing article by Restatement Reporter
Robert Braucher, Interpretation and Legal Effect in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 13 (1981)]. Rather, whether or not the language used is ambiguous on its
face, the Restatement Second encourages the parties to plumb the context surrounding the
particular bargain to aid the trier of fact in interpreting the "term"-that is, ascertaining its
"meaning."
40. See U.C.C. § 2-202.
41. See NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 598
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The Code makes extrinsic evidence more readily admissible because it
permits supplementation of the written contract with contemporaneous oral and
written agreements unless the written contract is proved to be a complete
integration.42 The UCC clearly rejects the "four corners" approach in adopting
an express provision concerning the admissibility of evidence of trade usage or
course of dealing between the parties. The official comment explicitly states that
the Code
rejects both the "lay-dictionary" and the "conveyancer's" reading of a com-
mercial agreement. Instead the meaning of the agreement of the parties is to
be determined by the language used by them and by their action .... which
may explain and supplement even the language of a formal or final writing.4 3
The modern judicial trend, the Second Restatement, and Article 2 of the UCC
all point toward the victory of Corbin's view of the parol evidence rule. Most
courts today 44 admit parol evidence for purposes of determining whether a
(1955). The UCC reflected Karl Llewellyn's view that the "law of the transaction is embedded in the
total situation and that the task of the 'law authority' is to discover it." Such an inquiry was, in
Llewellyn's view, "a more reliable source of certainty" that "the rigid, external system of contract
law." Speidel, supra note 34, at 791.
42. See, e.g., Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc. v. Securalloy Co., 312 F. Supp. 801, 804 (D. Conn.
1970) (holding that U.C.C. § 2-202 "was intended to liberalize the parol evidence rule and to abolish
the presumption that a writing is a total integration").
43. U.C.C. § 1-205 & cmt. 1. Marie Reilly has suggested to one of us that this "co-reverence" for
contextual evidence with textual evidence of intention was Corbin's ultimate victory over Williston.
See, e.g., Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that trade
usage that asphalt seller would allow buyers who needed asphalt for previously bid contracts to
purchase for price at time of bid not inconsistent with contract provision that buyer would pay seller's
"posted price").
44. But see, e.g., Nicholson v. United States,29 Fed. Cl. 180, 193 (1993). The court determined that
under the plain meaning rule and the Willistonian parol evidence rule extrinsic evidence about the
agreement was inadmissible since the integration was complete and final.
In a recent article, Professor Ralph Mooney has suggested that several western state courts, most
notably in California, have reverted to excluding extrinsic evidence in contract interpretation in a
manner that Williston would have favored and Corbin deplored. Ralph James Mooney, The New
Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REv. 1131, 1146 (1995). In several cases, Professor Mooney
reports that California courts have excluded specific and precise extrinsic evidence of promises made
by employers because of provisions in form contracts (or, in one case, an employment application) that
the courts determined demonstrated the parties' agreement that the written text was completely
integrated. See id. at 1151-53 (citing, for example, Gerdlund v. Electronic Dispensers Int'l, 235 Cal.
Rptr. 279 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 265 Cal. Rptr. 412 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989)).
Professor Mooney also cites Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum, Inc. v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 243
Cal. Rptr. 300, 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), in which the court, in seeming contradiction to Pacific Gas,
conceded that a contract must be interpreted to give effect to the parties' intent, but that intent,
whenever possible, must be "ascertained from the writing alone." We believe that this case illustrates
our thesis that exclusion of extrinsic evidence can enhance judicial subjectivity and discretion.
The litigaiion arose in the context of the highly controversial (favored in Southern California,
despised in the San Francisco Bay Area) uprooting of the Oakland Raiders football team to Los
Angeles. A 1966 agreement set forth a rental fee based on a percentage of gross receipts, with a clause
providing that the rent would be significantly reduced if the Oakland Coliseum "entered into" a lease
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writing is integrated, either partially or fully, and ascertaining the meaning even
of words that appear to the judge-based on the "extrinsic evidence" of her
own background and experience-to be plain and unambiguous. This approach
is regarded, correctly in our view, as facilitating the ability of private parties to
reach voluntary bargains through manifesting shared understandings, and limit-
ing judges' ability to frustrate these bargains through "objective" interpreta-
tions.
II. EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The New Textualism movement and its focus on the plain meaning of a
statute's language did not arise in a vacuum. Rather, it emerged as a reaction to
the use of legislative history in the process of statutory construction. The courts'
extensive use of legislative history since World War II provided an inviting
target for New Textualists, who raised a host of objections to this prevalent
interpretive technique. This part of our article develops the argument that New
Textualism's hostility to extrinsic interpretive evidence is, in many significant
ways, a resurrection of Willistonian principles of contract interpretation. Such
hostility is inconsistent with the widespread view held by courts, commentators,
and legislators that extrinsic evidence is a useful tool in interpreting contracts.
Given the rejection of Williston's view and the ascendancy of Corbin's view
that judges who limit their analysis to the contract's text will simply bring their
with a baseball tenant "during the term of the agreement." In 1968, the Athletics moved to Oakland,
and the Raiders' rent was reduced. In 1979, when the Raiders' terminated the agreement, the parties
entered into short-term leases, with rent "in accordance with" the original 1966 agreement. The
Coliseum then insisted that the rent not reflect the presence of the baseball team, because it had not
"entered into" any agreement with the Athletics "during the term of the [new, short-term] agreement."
The Raiders sought to introduce declarations by counsel and letters exchanged between the parties
supporting their construction of the contract that the rent would reflect the same reduction that existed
in the original, terminated agreement. However, a trial judge sitting in Oakland, and three Northern
Californian appellate judges, found that the plain language of the contract provided that no rent
reduction was necessary.
To be sure, result-oriented judges could well have reached the same result even if the extrinsic
evidence had been admitted, but it would have been more difficult for them to do so. The case illustrates
how the ability of judges to interpret the "plain meaning" of a text in a manner consistent with their
own backgrounds and biases can be enhanced, and not limited, by the exclusion of extrinsic evidence.
Whether Professor Mooney's observations accurately reflect a resurrection of the Willistonian
approach to contract law is beyond the scope of this Article. Cf City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior
Court, 914 P.2d 160, 188 (Cal. 1996) (citing Pacific Gas for proposition that extrinsic evidence can
demonstrate an ambiguity even if court does not believe one appears on its face). We note, in any event,
there are some plausible arguments for exclusion of parol evidence in contracts that would not apply to
statutory interpretation, see text accompanying supra notes 107-10, and that do not undercut Corbin's
essential argument that excluding extrinsic aids promotes rather than limits judicial discretion. Signifi-
cantly, Professor Mooney concluded that this textualist trend-wholly judicially created-almost
always seems to benefit sellers, banks, insurers, and employers, and disfavors economic "underdogs."
Mooney, supra, at 1170. Although we might agree with Professor Mooney's personal view that this
trend is troubling, even for those who believe that it reflects an essential correction of the excesses of
the last twenty-five years and will result in economic efficiency and increased social wealth, it is clear
that the result is judicially activist.
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own prejudices and perspectives to bear, advocates of New Textualism bear the
burden of demonstrating that either Corbin is wrong or that statutes are different
from contracts. In this Part, we first describe the background in which New
Textualism arose and then describe the principal textualist techniques. Finally,
we suggest that New Textualism, like Williston's theory of contract interpreta-
tion, overstates the inherent clarity of "plain meaning" and understates the
inevitability that textualist interpretation means that extrinsic evidence is lim-
ited to the judge's personal background and predilections.
A. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PRIOR TO NEW TEXTUALISM
The two dominant modes of statutory construction in this century have
reflected efforts by judges either to effectuate the legislature's actual intent, or to
carry out the public purposes underlying the legislation. Both of these ap-
proaches were intended to constrain judicial policymaking and to further the
policy preferences of elected legislators. In applying either an intentionalist or a
purposivist approach, judges often resorted to the legislative debates.
A well-known example that illustrates both the trend toward and the case for
an intentionalist approach is Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co.4 5 The lower court
used a strict textual approach to reject the claim that Southern Pacific had
violated the Railway Safety Appliance Act.4 6 In defending the textual approach,
Circuit Judge Sanborn used language that could have been drafted by Williston:
The primary rule for the interpretation of a statute or a contract is to
ascertain, if possible, and enforce, the intention which the legislative body
that enacted the law, or the parties who made the agreement, have expressed
therein. But it is the intention expressed in the law or contract, and that only,
that the courts may give effect to. They cannot lawfully assume or presume
secret purposes that are not indicated or expressed by the statute itself and
then enact provisions to accomplish these supposed intentions. While ambigu-
ous terms and doubtful expressions may be interpreted to carry out the
intention of a legislative body which a statute fairly evidences, a secret
intention cannot be interpreted into a statute which is plain and unambiguous,
and which does not express it. The legal presumption is that the legislative
body expressed its intention, that it intended what it expressed, and that it
intended nothing more. Construction and interpretation have no place or office
45. 196 U.S. 1 (1904).
46. 27 Stat. 531 (1893) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-43 (1982)). Section 2 of the statute
prohibited a railroad from using "on its line any car ... not equipped with couplers coupling
automatically by impact, and which [could] be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between
the ends of the cars." Invoking the canon expresio unius est exclusio alterius, the court noted that
because section 1 of the Act specifically governed locomotives and required certain brake equipment,
the reference in Section 2 to "any car" excluded locomotives from its scope. See Johnson v. Southern
Pacific Co., 117 F. 462, 466 (8th Cir. 1902), rev'd, 196 U.S. 1 (1904). The court also noted that the
statute was in derogation of common law and, because it provided for fines, was penal in nature, thus
requiring a strict construction of the word "car." See id. at 467.
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where the terms of a statute are clear and certain, and its meaning is plain.47
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. The Court noted that the interpre-
tive maxims relied upon by the court of appeals in its analysis were not gospel,
but only guideposts to discerning Congress's intent.48 And, according to the
Court, determining congressional intent requires a study of legislative history.
To support its conclusion that Southern Pacific was liable under the statute,
Chief Justice Fuller relied not only on textual analysis but also on the purpose
behind the legislation, as reflected in President Harrison's messages to Congress
advocating the law, and the House and Senate Committee reports.49 The Court
also utilized legislative history to reject alternative interpretations of the statute
that would have exonerated the railroad from liability.
50
Southern Pacific reflected a change in accepted interpretive techniques. The
first edition of Sutherland's celebrated treatise on statutory interpretation had
announced that courts "will not hear proof of extrinsic facts known to the
47. Southern Pacific, 117 F. at 465 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
48. See id. at 15.
49. See id. at 16 (context, subject-matter, and object all suggest that statutory phrase "any car"
meant all kinds of cars running on the rails, including locomotives, and broader definition of "car" to
include locomotives was supported by dictionary definitions); id. at 19-20 (citing four annual presiden-
tial messages, S. REP. No. 1049, 52d Cong. (1892), and H. REP. No. 1678, 52d Cong. (1892).
50.. In the court of appeals, Judge Thayei had concurred on a separate textual ground-that Southern
Pacific had complied with the statute by installing automatic couplers on each car, even though they
were not compatible. See Southern Pacific, 117 F. at 473-74. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected
this theory, finding evidence in the Senate floor debates that the "difficulty as to interchangeability was
fully in the mind of Congress, and was assumed to be met by the language which was used. The
essential degree of uniformity was secured by providing that the coupling must couple automatically by
impact without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars." Southern Pacific, 196 U.S. at
20 (citing 24 CONG. REc. 1246, 1273 et seq. (1892)).
The need for extrinsic evidence is even more apparent when considering another question raised by
Judge Thayer's concurrence. As detailed in Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge is Not the Primary Official
with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CH.-
KENT L. REv. 321, 323-24 (1990), a strong policy argument could be raised that couplers were an
emerging technology with dozens of designs, that the use of standard equipment was not common in
the railroad industry, and that an interpretation requiring a single design could result in an anticompeti-
tive monopoly for one equipment manufacturer. Although such an argument is plausible, it is not what
Congress intended. The legislative debates quoted by the Supreme Court, see Southern Pacific, 117 F.
at 20-21 (relying on Senate and House committee reports and floor debates), and the fact that the
Interstate Commerce Commission, authorized by the statute to establish its effective date and to enforce
the provision, had consistently taken the view that cars must be equipped with compatible couplers,
demonstrate that the overriding policy concern of the day was the desire to prevent the significant
injuries caused when railroad workers were required to manually couple or decouple cars. See Strauss,
supra, at 324 n.10. These historic facts, of course, are not apparent from the four corners of the text,
and cannot be gleaned from interpretive maxims.
Some New Textualists might argue that, pursuant to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the ICC's interpretation, rather than the Senate debates, is
entitled to great deference, suggesting that the correct result could have been reached in Southern
Pacific in the lower court without resort to legislative history. But Chevron instructs courts to defer to
agencies only when the statutory text is unclear. See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston &
Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417 (1992); K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988). The
Eighth Circuit, recall, had found that the text was unambiguous.
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legislature or members thereof which are supposed to indicate their intention in
passing a law."' 51 By the time the second edition was published in 1904 (the
same year that Southern Pacific was decided), the treatise had changed, announc-
ing that "proceedings of the legislature in reference to the passage of an act
may be taken into consideration in construing the act.",
52
That two appellate judges, without the benefit of extrinsic evidence, thought
that the railroad was not liable based on a narrow definition of the word "car,"
and that nine Supreme Court Justices, with the benefit of such evidence, thought
that the word "car" "manifestly" included locomotives, is illustrative of the
difficulties posed by a textualist approach to interpretation. One could argue that
the court of appeals' decision in Johnson was simply bad textualism. 53 Corbin
might well concede the point, but he would likely respond that it was no
accident that those who looked at the broad array of extrinsic evidence correctly
answered the textual question.54
Intentionalism was not without its critics. The Legal Realists charged that
intentionalist judges were inverting their reasoning process by determining in
some other way whether the statute should or should not cover the issue in
litigation, then announcing their conclusion clothed in intentionalist rhetoric.
55
Although this critique has been echoed by New Textualists,56 the latter ignore
51. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 365, 371 n.18 (1990)
(quoting JABEZ G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 380 (1st ed. 1891)).
52. JABEZ.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 879-83 (John Lewis ed., 2d
ed., 1904).
53. The keynote to textualism is to interpret words in accord with their ordinary meaning. See infra
text accompanying notes 74-79. Excluding locomotives from the definition of a "railroad car" is
arguably inconsistent with such a meaning. Cf. HENRY H. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1142 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
54. Within the last few years, the British House of Lords overturned centuries of precedent to permit
reference to parliamentary debates as an aid to interpreting British statutes, guided in large measure by
precisely the recognition that extrinsic evidence increases the accuracy of judicial interpretation, rather
than increasing judicial willfulness. See Pepper v. Hart, 3 W.L.R. 1031 (H.L. 1992). Initially, a panel of
the Lords had ruled-limiting its inquiry to the sort of techniques approved by Williston and Justice
Scalia-that a tax statute favored Inland Revenue. This judgment was reconsidered and reversed by a
subsequent panel who examined the legislative debates and found an express statement by the relevant
minister that the statute was intended to favor the taxpayer. One reason why Parliament might enact a
provision that subsequent inquiry shows to be capable of multiple meanings "is that the members of the
legislature in enacting the statutory provision may have been told what result those words are intended
to achieve." Id. at 1056.
Significantly, although the Lords stated that it would not "attach a meaning to words which they
cannot bear," id., five Lords had previously found that the term had only one meaning, which was
opposite of that intended by the drafting minister.
55. See, e.g., Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 863, 868-69 (1930).
56. See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 651-52 (Scalia's attack on legislative history "was primarily a
realist one," following Radin critique of the concept of collective legislative intent). Then-Judge Scalia
(as he then was) said:
That a majority of both houses of Congress (never mind the President, if he signed rather than
vetoed the bill) entertained any view with regard to [interpretive] issues is utterly beyond
belief. For a virtual certainty, the majority of Members were blissfully unaware of the
existence of the issue, much less had any preference as to how it should be resolved.
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the Realist deconstruction of text as well as intent. For example, Max Radin's
solution was not to rely on a statute's objective meaning, but to allow judges
and administrators to use the text to "perform their own specialized func-
tions.",57 These functions included having judges ask, "[W]hat is desirable ....
what is just, what is proper, what satisfies the social emotions of the judge, what
fits into the ideal scheme of society which he entertains."
58
The academic response to Radin further supports the proposition that the use
of extrinsic evidence frustrates government-by-the-judiciary. Writing in the
same issue of the Harvard Law Review as Radin, Professor James Landis saw
legislative history as critical to identifying the real, rather than fictitious, intent
of a legislature. He felt that the use of legislative history was essential in order
to restrain judges from attempting to "override the intent of the legislature in
order to make law according to their own views."' 59 A well-known opponent of
judicial activism, Justice Felix Frankfurter, shared the view that the failure to
consider extrinsic evidence facilitates judicial bias.6 °
In response to the Realist critique of intentionalism, Professors Henry Hart
and Albert Sacks proposed that courts involved in the task of statutory interpreta-
tion should ascertain the statute's meaning so as to carry out its purpose. 6' Legal
Id. at 652 n. 118 (quoting Antonin Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative History delivered at various law
schools (fall 1985 and spring 1986)).
57. Radin, supra note 55, at 871.
58. Id. at 884.
59. Landis, supra note 14, at 890-91. See Eskridge, supra note 51, at 374 (endorsing view of Landis
and others that "authorial intent is a more objective, more reliable source of statutory meaning than
textual analysis standing alone").
60. See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527
(1947). Frankfurter, whose expressed goal was judicial restraint, id. at 534, criticized the English
refusal to consider legislative history. Sounding much like Corbin, Frankfurter wrote that British
"judges deem themselves limited to reading the words of a statute. But can they really escape placing
the words in the context of their minds, which after all are not automata applying legal logic but
repositories of all sorts of assumptions and impressions?" Id. at 541. Although cautioning that
"[s]purious use of legislative history must not swallow the legislation so as to give point to the quip
that only when legislative history is doubtful do you go to the statute," and that a loose statement made
by the sponsor "will hardly be accorded the weight of an encyclical," he suggested that, for example, a
"painstaking, detailed report by a Senate Committee bearing directly on the immediate question may
settle the matter." Id. at 543.
61. See HART & SACKS, supra note 53, at 1374. This purposivist approach was not original to Hart
and Sacks, of course; it has been with us since at least 1584, when the Exchequer Court set forth a
four-step process for the "sure and true interpretation of all statutes":
I st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide.
3rd. What remedy the parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth.
And 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges is always to
make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to
suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato
commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the
makers of the Act, pro bono publico.
Heydon's Case, 30 Co. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Exch. 1584).
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process theory relies upon the notion that judges and lawyers can determine the
purpose of a statute by examining both the statutory text and the legislative
history produced in the legislative process. Rather than binding herself to the
text of a statute, the purposivist seeks to ascertain the statute's purpose so as to
provide a context for its language. The legal process theory thus departs from
both intentionalism and textualism by implying that courts exercise a lawmak-
ing function by attributing a purpose to a statute that may or may not have been
recognized by the voting legislators themselves. 62 Still, critical to the interpre-
tive process was that while legislatures have unfettered discretion to establish
policy through statutes, "courts are charged with the reasoned elaboration of
policies chosen by legislatures, a process that limits judicial discretion."
63
Both intentionalism and purposivism have attracted strong theoretical criti-
cism. However, our question, as we will try to develop it, is not whether these
critiques have validity, but whether an alternative approach that bars judges
from using legislative history as an interpretive aid represents an improvement.
B. THE NEW TEXTUALIST RESPONSE TO CONVENTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Justice Antonin Scalia, recognizing the shortcomings of both intentionalism
and purposivism, has championed a vision of statutory construction that empha-
sizes the need for judges to disregard legislative history in the vast majority of
cases.64 Dismissing indicia of the intent of the members of Congress who
enacted a law, Justice Scalia would interpret a statute based on the meaning
which is:
(1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to
have been understood by the whole Congress which voted on the words of the
statute (not to mention the citizens subject to it), and (2) most compatible with
the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated-a
compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always has in
mind. I would not permit any of the historical or legislative material ... to
lead me to a result different from the one that these factors suggest.
65
Hence, in this "four corners", 6 6 approach to interpretation, statutory meaning is
determined solely on the basis of the interpreting judge's view of the language
itself, within the context of the surrounding language.6 7 The reason courts must
62. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reason-
ing, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 335 (1990).
63. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The
Legal Process, in HART & SACKS, supra note 53, at cxx.
64. See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 650.
65. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
66. While "four comers" is a contract term specifying the limits of what a court may use to interpret
the writing, it has found its way into the lexicon of statutory interpreters. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd
Co., Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1074 (1995); West Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 112 (1990).
67. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. Rev.
423, 455 (1988).
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look for an "objectified" intent, according to Scalia, is that "it is simply
incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair govern-
ment, to have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant,
rather than what the lawgiver promulgated." 68 Justice Scalia makes it clear that
his principal practical objection to the intentionalist and purposive approaches is
that reliance on legislative history "has facilitated rather than deterred decisions
that are based upon the courts' policy preferences, rather than neutral principles
of law."' 69 When using legislative history:
judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending their
lawmaking proclivities from the common law to the statutory field. When you
are told to decide, not on the basis of what the legislature said, but on the
basis of what it meant, and are assured that there is no necessary connection
between the two, your best shot at figuring out what the legislature meant is to
ask yourself what a wise and intelligent person should have meant; and that
will surely bring you to the conclusion that the law means what you think it
ought to mean.7°
68. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 17.
69. Id. at 35.
70. Id. at 17-18 (emphasis in original). At times, though, Justice Scalia and other New Textualists
suggest that the problem with legislative history is not that it gives too much discretion to judges, but
not enough-that it gives too much power to legislative subgroups. For example, in a concurring
opinion in Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989) Justice Scalia castigated his eight colleagues for
interpreting a statute in accord with a committee report that approvingly cited the holdings of three
lower court cases. Reasoning that a member of the committee staff or a lobbyist, rather than Congress
itself, who probably intended the statute to follow these prior cases, Justice Scalia wrote: "What a
heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to know that his or her citation of obscure district court
cases can transform them into the law of the land, thereafter dutifully to be observed by the Supreme
Court itself." Id. at 99.
The concerns that Justice Scalia articulated in Blanchard reveal the difficulty with his mission of
accomplishing judicial objectivity through textualism. The case involved an interpretation of a provi-
sion of federal law allowing the prevailing party to receive "a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs" in an action brought under certain federal civil rights laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994).
Although Justice Scalia disapproved of the majority opinion's reliance on the committee report, he
nonetheless concurred in the judgment, endorsing the additional justifications that the majority offered
to explain why its ruling was "reasonable, consistent, and faithful to [the statute's] apparent purpose."
489 U.S. at 100. In other words, Justice Scalia concluded that fees should be awarded based on what
judges thought was a reasonable standard, rejecting the only evidence as to what the legislature thought
was a reasonable standard.
As Judge Wald cogently observed:
This approach, however, begs the questions: "reasonable" to whom? "Apparent" to whom?
The answer, so far as I can see, is the writing judge. Which, then, is the best source: 1) the
ruminations of an article III judge who has turned away from legislative materials to discern
independently a "pattern" or a "reasonable purpose" in a statute in order to shed light on an
issue that the statutory language itself fails to clearly settle; or, 2) the admittedly non-binding,
but often illuminating, declarations of a House or Senate report explaining what the commit-
tee thought it was doing, or the speech of a bill's sponsor in which the sponsor declares his or
her objectives in introducing the legislation? Given a choice, I would pin my hopes for
fidelity to the "intentions of Congress" on the latter.
Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the
1988-89 Term of the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277, 305 (1990) (citations omitted).
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These attacks on the use of legislative intent seem to be traceable to an old
nugget passed on from Justice Holmes: "we do not inquire what the legislature
meant; we ask only what the statute means.", 71 Holmes' views are mirrored in
the Seventh Circuit by Judge Easterbrook,72 who has written that original
meaning can be derived from the words and structure and perhaps from the
purpose of the text, but what any member of Congress thought about these
words is irrelevant, since meaning and intent are not the same thing.73 The
71. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. REv. 417, 419
(1912). As William Eskridge has astutely noted, though, Justice Holmes in fact did rely on legislative
history in statutory interpretation, insisting that the plain meaning rule did not "preclude consideration
of persuasive evidence if it exists." Eskridge, supra note 51, at 388 n.87 (quoting Boston Sand &
Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928)).
72. Then-Professor Easterbrook favorably cited Holmes' quotation in his own exposition of proper
techniques of statutory construction. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv.
533, 535 (1983).
73. See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.); Frank Easterbrook, The
Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 56, 61 (1988). Judge
Easterbrook's discussion of legislative history in Sinclair has a shotgun quality, but deserves fuller
attention. First, and 'significantly, he suggests that to "decode words one must frequently reconstruct the
legal and political culture of the drafters." Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1342. In this regard, legislative history
"may be invaluable in revealing the setting of the enactment and the assumptions its authors enter-
tained about how their words would be understood." Id. Significantly, Easterbrook suggests, contrary to
Williston and Justice Scalia, that legislative history should be used even when a judge's examination of
the text suggests a contrary, plain meaning, although he may have intended this to be a narrow
exception for technical terms. Id. (legislative history "may show, too, that words with a denotation
'clear' to an outsider are terms of art, with an equally 'clear' but different meaning to an insider). It is
thus unclear, for example, whether, to play on the facts of Blanchard v. Bergeron (discussed supra note
70), Easterbrook would consider, in interpreting a floor amendment that provided that prevailing
attorneys were to receive "reasonable" fees, a floor statement by the sponsor that explained an intent to
incorporate several judicial interpretations of "reasonableness."
Ultimately, Easterbrook concludes that legislative history "may help a court discover but may not
change the original meaning." Id. at 1344 (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988)). This
conclusion itself is ambiguous. Perhaps this means, given the suggestion that extrinsic evidence may
create an ambiguity that is not apparent from a study of the text, that clear legislative history should
govern unless a court concludes that legislators certainly would not have used the words chosen for the
text if they really meant what the history claims. If so, this view is akin to the UCC's approach to parol
evidence that requires the exclusion of extrinsic evidence if a reasonable person "certainly" would have
included the proffered provision in the written contract. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
Alternatively, Easterbrook could mean that if the judge is not persuaded that the words mean what the
legislators said they mean, she should go with her own linguistic interpretation. Cf. Central States,
Southeast and Southwest Pension Fund v. Central Cartage Co., 69 F.3d 1312 (7th Cir. 1995). In that
case, Judge Easterbrook rejected parol evidence that the collective bargaining agreement requirement
for employer contributions to the Teamster's pension fund was not intended to cover casual workers
who were not Teamsters. He noted that (analogous to statutes) a multiparty pension agreement was
"not a normal two-party contract for which evidence of idiosyncratic meaning may be used to depart
from the objective meaning of the words," id. at 1315, but then suggested that the evidence would be
inadmissible even if it could be shown that the entire multi-member pension board was aware of its
negotiator's parol understanding. See also Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 616 (7th Cir.
1993) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (arguing that dissent plus plurality all agree that "extrinsic
evidence cannot create an ambiguity in otherwise clear documents"). Such a view, like Justice Scalia's
and Williston's, by permitting a judge to say that a textual phrase is clear even when there is evidence
that the parties thought it was not, is not likely to reduce judicial discretion.
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Holmesean approach rejects the simple maxim that beauty, or in this case
meaning, is in the eye of the beholder.
Because the New Textualists refuse to rely upon legislative history as evi-
dence of the actual intent behind the statutory text, they must rely upon some
other indicia of meaning. In their view, courts should discern a "reasonable
meaning" for the statutory text they are construing.74 To aid them in this task,
the New Textualists advocate the use of interpretive tools that bear a remarkable
resemblance to Williston's approach to construing contracts: the judge's view of
the plain meaning of the words; her own review of the structure and logic of the
statute; and judicially created canons of statutory interpretation. 5
Justice Scalia, for example, has suggested a variety of interpretive techniques
that do not require analysis of legislative history, but give weight to "objective"
indicia that reflect the judge's view of what a reasonable person would mean,
rather than the objective manifestations of the legislature's subjective intent that
might be found in legislative history.76 Another New Textualist method is
simply to see which interpretation "better fits" with the statute when read as a
whole. With this method, Justice Scalia seeks a construction that "fits most
logically and comfortably" into the corpus juris.77 If these tools do not prove
dispositive, the New Textualists resort to a host of canons of statutory construc-
tion.78 Of course, the choice of meanings that is the "better fit" and the
74. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 30 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
75. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); West Va. Univ.
Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991). See also United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1319
(7th Cir. 1991), affid sub nom. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
76. In Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 529 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring), he
suggested that judges first adopt the meaning most in accord with (their view of) context and ordinary
usage, reasoning that this meaning was what the whole Congress would have understood when voting,
stopping to compare the words at issue with the surrounding body of law into which the provision is
integrated. In other cases, Justice Scalia looked to a dictionary definition of the relevant term, see, e.g.,
Chan v. Korean Airlines, 490 U.S. 122, 128 (1989); Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 113
(1988), and the structure of the act itself (to see if the same term is used in other parts of the statute in a
way that clarifies its meaning), see United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U.S.
365, 371 (1988).
77. West Va. Univ. Hosps., 499 U.S. at 100-01.
78. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 738-39 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(prescript that the specific controls the general and that statutes dealing with similar subjects ought to
be interpreted harmoniously). In Chan, 490 U.S. at 131-33, for example, Justice Scalia relied upon the
canon inclusio unius est exlusio alterius (the inclusion of one implies the exclusion of others) in
holding that the inclusion of a certain sanction in two sections of a treaty, coupled with its omission in a
third section, indicated that the drafters meant to exclude the sanction in that third section, over
objections that the bargaining history of the treaty at issue in Chan suggested that the drafters intended
for all three sections to be treated the same. Id. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf *In re American
Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1988) (questioning canon for inaccurately assuming
omniscience on the part of drafters); National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 676
(D.C. Cit. 1973) (same); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 813 (1983) (same). Significantly, in American Reserve, Judge
Easterbrook suggested that reference to legislative history may be appropriate to determine if Congress
has created an intentionally exhaustive statute or if, instead, Congress has not yet grappled with the
problem at issue in the case. See 840 F.2d at 492. See also DICKERSON, supra note 25, at 234 (listing this
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selection of the appropriate interpretive canon is subject to considerable judicial
discretion.79
Critical to the New Textualists' rejection of legislative history is their argu-
ment that actual legislative intent is irrelevant.8" Of course, the true "subjective
intent" of the legislators is almost impossible to ascertain, but no serious
advocate of the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation really
supports the straw argument textualists have raised in opposition to their own
approach-there is no suggestion, for example, that if Robert Taft had a secret
diary, it ought to be consulted in interpreting the Taft-Hartley Act. Rather, the
real controversy is not whether to apply an objective or a subjective approach to
as among several "Latin maxims [that] masquerade as rules of interpretation while doing nothing more
than describing results reached by other means").
Other canons which have been revived by the New Textualists include the "federalism canon,"
which creates a presumption against interpreting congressional statutes to usurp traditional state
powers, see, e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 538 (1994), and the canon that requires
an incredibly strong statement of intent to change the law when Congress revises and consolidates
statutes. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 554 (1989).
79. West Virginia Hospitals is illustrative. Splitting roughly on conventional ideological lines, a
six-justice majority, including Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, White, O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter, held that denying reimbursement for expert witness fees in civil rights cases provided the
best "fit" for an interpretation of the relevant statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994). Justices Blackmun,
Marshall, and Stevens all dissented, presenting arguments as to why they thought that permitting
reimbursement for expert witnesses was a better interpretive fit. West Virginia Hospitals, 499 U.S. at
102 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see id. at 108-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Professor Corbin, certainly,
would not be surprised that the justices' findings regard something so subjective as "fit" would follow
predictable ideological lines. See also infra note 162 and accompanying text (conservative, textualist
judges reach conservative results).
For a critique of the objectivity of the use of canons, see Karl L. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory
of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REv. 395 (1950).
80. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 30 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Continental Can Co. v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.)
Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) (only the "text of the statute, and
not the private intent of the legislators, is the law"); SCALIA, supra note 1, at 16 (equally criticizing use
of floor debates or subsequent affidavits from legislators about what they "really meant" (emphasis
added)).
Legisprudential commentators have occasionally ventured into the contract analogy by citing Judge
Learned Hand in Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of N.Y, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). See, e.g., W.
David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation under the Rule of
Law, 44 STAN. L. REv. 383, 421 (1992). Hand wrote:
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the
parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the
parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. If, how-
ever, it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used the words, intended
something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes upon them, he would still be
held, unless there were some mutual mistake, or something else of the sort.
Hotchkiss, 200 F. at 293. However, the relevant passage contains an important additional, qualifying
sentence. Judge Hand added, "[o]f course, if it appear by other words, or acts, of the parties, that they
attribute a peculiar meaning to such words as they use in the contract, that meaning will prevail, but
only by virtue of the other words, and not because of their unexpressed intent." Id. at 293. Courts will
often quote the first portion of the paragraph, without the second. See, e.g., Luden's Inc. v. Local Union
No. 6, 28 F.3d 347, 364 (2d Cir. 1994).
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meaning, but whether to consider evidence (pre-contract oral agreements, or
pre-enactment legislative history) that demonstrates, in an objective way, how
the parties manifested their subjective intentions.
8'
C. SOME CRITIQUES OF NEW TEXTUALISM
New Textualism has attracted widespread criticism.82 The most obvious
81. This distinction reveals a major problem with a recent argument against the contract analogy
raised in Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really "Legislative Bargains"? The Failure of the Contract
Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1145 (1998). Movsesian suggests that contracts
are properly interpreted to give effect to the parties' subjective intent, thus justifying the use of parol
evidence in contract interpretation. However, neither Corbin nor nontextualist statutory interpreters
advocate subjective intentionalism; rather, they propose the use of extrinsic aids to allow judges to
effectuate the objectively manifested intent of the parties.
As an effective illustration of the importance of objective manifestations of intent, Professor Marie
Reilly observes that negotiations finalized by a handshake would often be taken by Americans to be
strong evidence of an intention to be bound, while in Japan the handshake would not have this
significance. She suggests that New Textualists find legislative history to be as probative of intent as
Japanese bankers would find a handshake.
The problem with the New Textualist position is that is simply empirically wrong. There is ample
evidence that legislators do consider floor statements, committee reports, and, occasionally, statements
(usually admissions against interest) in hearings to be highly relevant and objective manifestations of
the meaning they attach to text. According to Rep. Robert Kastenmeier, chair (as he then was) of a key
House Judiciary Committee subcommittee:
It is probably safe to say that most of us in the Congress assume committee reports,
colloquies on the floor and other sources of legislative history can explain and amplify
statutory language in ways that are instructive to the courts.
Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Prop., and the Admin. of Justice, Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 2 (1990). Even
those in the legislative minority, who have less control of the legislative record, agree. According to
Rep. Carlos Moorhead, Kastenmeier's senior Republican counterpart on the subcommittee:
I think there are situations where we can provide specific guidance to the courts as to
congressional intent by way of carefully constructed legislative history.
Sometimes, I think it would be helpful if more of the judges had legislative experience
because it is very difficult . . . to get a feeling of legislative intent unless you look to the
reports and to the debates.
Id. at 2-3. See also James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1, 40 (1994).
Indeed, the common use of legislative history intended to provide explanations for textual meaning is
itself good evidence that legislators do find such history to be relevant. For example, in developing a
specific statutory standard to guide courts in reviewing antitrust challenges to research and development
joint ventures, Congress chose to reject more specific criteria spelled out in earlier legislative proposals
in favor of a broad standard of "reasonableness, taking into account all relevant factors affecting
competition." Pub. L. No. 98-462 § 3, 98 Stat. 1816 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (1994)). In doing so,
the Conference Report clearly provided that the drafters' intent was to have the detailed legislative
history agreed to by the conferees serve as an authoritative gloss on this broad standard. See H.R. CoNF.
REP. No. 98-1044, at 8 (1984).
82. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, pt. 111 (1990); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A
MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION, ch. 5 (1988); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in
Interpreting Statutes, 65 So. CAL. L. REv. 845, 861-74 (1992); Brudney, supra note 81, at 40-66;
Edward 0. Correia, A Legislative Conception of Legislative Supremacy, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1129
(1992); Eskridge, supra note 1; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993
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problem with the New Textualist approach to statutory construction is that in
many cases textual context provides insufficient insight to enable the legal
community to reach a consensus on the proper interpretation of a statute.
Language is almost always open to interpretation.83 This is particularly true in
Supreme Court cases, because challenges to statutes with a widely agreed upon
meaning are usually resolved before they reach that level.84 As a result, reliance
upon the dictionary definition of words (many of which have multiple and often
very different meanings) or interpretive canons 85 is an inadequate substitute for
the type of context that can be provided by outside sources.8 6
A second criticism raised by those who, like New Textualists, seek to
constrain a judge's ability to substitute her own policy preferences for those of
the legislature, is that the very elected legislators whose primacy textualists are
supposedly promoting often expect the courts to look to the legislative history
in interpreting statutes. 87 From this perspective, ignoring the will of the policy-
Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REV. 27, 77 (1994); Eskridge & Frickey, supra
note 62, at 340-45 (1990); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism,
and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REv. 533, 549-54 (1992); Hatch, supra note 8; Michael Herz,
Textualism and Taboo: Interpretations and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOzo L. REv. 1663,
1670 (1991); Robert M. Lawless, Legisprudence Through a Bankruptcy Lens: A Study in the Supreme
Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 47 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1 (1996); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-
Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv.
223, 227 (1986); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 752 (1995); William
D. Popkin, Law-Making Responsibility and Statutory Interpretation, 68 IND. L.J. 865, 872 & n.36
(1993); William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1133 (1992); Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and
the Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L.
REv. 803, 825-31 (1994); Stephen F. Ross, The Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning, 73 WASH. U. L.Q.
1057 (1995); Stephen F. Ross, Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 399 (1990);
Bernard Schwartz, "Shooting the Piano Player"? Justice Scalia and Administrative Law, 47 ADMiN. L.
REv. 1 (1995); Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 Sup.
CT. REv. 429; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 405
(1989); Wald, supra note 70, at 306; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New
Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1597, 1639 (1991); Nicholas A. Zeppos, Legislative History and
the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv.
1295 (1990); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION 751 n.3 (2d ed. 1994) (collecting additional citations).
83. One of us has previously discussed this point in a bit more detail. See Ross, supra note 82, at
1061-62.
84. Wald, supra note 70, at 278.
85. See DICKERSON, supra note 25, at 234 (listing several "Latin maxims [that] masquerade as rules
of interpretation while doing nothing more than describing results reached by other means").
86. See, e.g., Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), affd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945) (Hand, J.)
("it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of
the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose
sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning"); Clark D. Cunningham et
a]., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L. J. 1561, 1614-16 (1994); Lawrence Solan, When
Judges Use the Dictionary, 68 AM. SPEECH 50 (1993).
87. Congress goes to a great deal of trouble to explain the text with sponsor statements, committee
reports, and other sources of legislative history by creating a formal historical record of the enactment
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making branch of the government by refusing to consult information that
Congress expects will be consulted constitutes unwarranted judicial activism.
88
Most significantly, while New Textualists claim that reliance on legislative
history allows judges to engage in policymaking, the use of "judicial common
sense" in determining plain meaning also allows considerable judicial subjectiv-
ity. While New Textualists complain that legislative history contains so much
information that judges can willfully select those portions that support the result
they otherwise prefer,89 the textual quiver also contains a plethora of sources to
choose from.90 When left only with the text, without the benefit of the legisla-
tive history to provide context, judges are forced to supply their own context
instead. As Judge Wald has noted:
Several opinions this past Term that eschewed legislative history replaced it
with what sometimes looked like a free-form romp through the "structure" of
a statute, or its "evident design and purpose." The phrase "Congress must
process. See Correia, supra note 82, at 1154. Although legislators are not likely to be intimately familiar
with the details of either the legislative history or the statute itself, members rely on the understanding
attached to the text by those members who are actively involved in sponsoring and supporting the
legislation. Indeed, when the drafters of a bill are concerned that material contained in hearings,
committee reports, or the floor debate may mislead judges called upon to interpret the statute, they are
free to specifically exclude such history from consideration, as Congress has in fact done on at least one
notable occasion. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105(b) Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
provides:
No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137 Congressional
Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be considered legislative history of, or relied
upon in any way as legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act that
relates to Wards Cove-Business necessity/cumulation/alternative business practice.
Query whether a textualist who believes in the reliability of the maxim expresio unius est exclusio
alterius, see Chan v. Korean Airlines, 490 U.S. 122, 131-33 (1989) (Scalia, J.), and who believes that
judges should construe statutes to make the entire body of statutory law as coherent as possible, see
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 529 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring), should view this
significant textual provision as evidence that, where such language is not included in the statute, judges
must consult legislative history! Cf. Dunning v. General Elec. Co., 892 F. Supp. 1424, 1430 & n.9
(M.D. Ala. 1995) (relying on two uncontradicted statements from Senate floor debate on Civil Rights
Act of 1991 as reliable indicia of legislative intent, and noting specifically that this history "takes on
added significance because of the importance legislators attached to legislative history in other areas of
the 1991 Act").
88. As Judge Wald has written, to disregard committee reports "is to second-guess Congress' chosen
form of organization and delegation of authority, and to doubt its ability to oversee its own constitu-
tional functions effectively." Wald, supra note 70, at 306-07. See also Brudney, supra note 81, at 40
(rejecting or systematically discounting legislative history is countermajoritarian, both in declining to
consult materials that are integral to Congress's chosen lawmaking process and in failing to acknowl-
edge the substantial opportunity costs imposed on Congress). Professor Brudney's article demonstrates
how refusal to credit reliable legislative history can frustrate Congress's ability to pass desired
legislation.
89. See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 36 (stating that in any major piece of legislation "the legislative
history is extensive, and there is something for everybody. As Judge Harold Leventhal used to say, the
trick is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick out your friends.").
90. See Pierce, supra note 82, at 765.
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have meant this or that" . . . appear[s] without apparent source other than the
writing judge's mindset. 9 1
Indeed, a number of well-known and controversial decisions employing New
Textualist methods appear to have reached results contrary to the congressional
intent manifested in seemingly reliable legislative history.92
The New Textualists thus seem to be validating the complaint made by James
Landis two-thirds of a century ago that the "real difficulty" in statutory
interpretation was that "strong judges prefer to override the intent of the
legislature in order to make law according to their own views" and that
"barbaric rules of interpretation" such as those that exclude legislative history
"too often exclude the opportunity to get at legislative meaning in a realistic
fashion.", 93 Indeed, Republican Senator Arlen Specter repeatedly raises the New
Textualist philosophy at confirmation hearings for federal judges, asserting that
when judges ignore legislative history they are making the law themselves.94
These observations are especially true with respect to interpretive canons.
Not only does each possible canon have a plausible counterpoint that a judge
can utilize to justify the contrary result,95 but, as Justice Scalia admits, a key
textualist canon is the "benign fiction" that Congress has carefully chosen its
language and writes its statutes in such a way as to maintain a harmony
96 Sthroughout the corpus juris. Justice Scalia candidly acknowledges that some
91. Wald, supra note 70, at 304-05. Textualist rhetoric obscures this theoretical flaw, by drawing a
false dichotomy between clear text and manipulable legislative history. Like the words in the Congres-
sional Record, the words in Statutes-at-Large have no single or objective meaning, and are equally
subject to manipulation. See Zeppos, supra note 82, at 1323.
92. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478 (1990). The court narrowly interpreted the meaning of
"any child support payment" in the Social Security Act to exclude insurance benefits paid to children
pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act, despite clear legislative history that Congress intended
the statutory phrase in a broader sense, id. at 492-94 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and notwithstanding
the fact that most state courts which had ruled on the issue have found the plain meaning of child
support to include Title II payments. See id. at 488 n.2.
Professor Brudney, supra note 81, at 14-15, provides another example: Public Employees Retirement
Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989). In an earlier case, McMann v. United Airlines, 434 U.S. 192 (1977),
the Court had narrowly defined the meaning of "subterfuge" under § 4(f)(2) of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602, 603 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Despite clear language in the conference report disapproving of the
court's "holding and reasoning" in McMann, H.R. CorN. REP. No. 95-950 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 529, Betts held that because Congress had failed to amend the textual provision at
issue the legislative history would not be given effect. 492 U.S. at 172.
93. Landis, supra note 14, at 890. Justice Scalia suggests that Dean Landis "would be aghast" at the
results, fifty years after Landis advocated the use of legislative history. ScALIA, supra note 1, at 35. This
conclusion, however, is entirely based on Justice Scalia's factual assertion that legislative history has
"facilitated rather than deterred decisions that are based upon the courts' policy preferences, rather than
neutral principles of law." Id. This article, of course, suggests that recourse to legislative history has
had precisely the opposite effect.
94. See Joan Biskupic, Listening In on the 'Conversation' Between Court and Congress, WASH.
POST, May 1, 1994, at A4.
95. See Llewellyn, supra note 79, at 401-06.
96. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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interpretive canons are troublesome for "honest textualists. ' ' 97 He concedes, for
example, that the rule that statutes in derogation of common law will be
narrowly construed "seems like a sheer power grab.", 98 Without explanation,
however, Justice Scalia asserts that others accurately reflect objective mean-
ing.99 But, significantly, he is unwilling to credit the less fictional assumption
that legislative history provides insight into the meaning intended by the
legislative body that created it.
Critical to the New Textualist project is the empirical assertion that the
exclusion of extrinsic evidence offered to provide an objective manifestation of
the drafters' intent furthers, rather than hinders, the effectuation of that intent (as
expressed in text). As applied to contract law, we suggested in Part I that
Corbin's insights are precisely to the contrary-limiting judges to textual
sources of interpretation furthers, rather than hinders, an interpretation consis-
tent with the judge's background, not the drafters. In Part III, we suggest that
the differences between contracts and statutes actually support, rather than
weaken, the applicability of Corbin's insights to statutory interpretation.
III. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONTRACT
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Corbin's insights into how extrinsic evidence constrains judicial subjectivity
in contract interpretation only inform the debate about statutory interpretation if
the process by which judges give meaning to the text of a contract is analogous
to the process by which judges implement a statute. In this part, we explore the
striking similarities between contract and statutory interpretation, particularly in
light of the rationales the New Textualists have advanced to support their
position. Both statutes and contracts are formalized bargains among actors with
diverse and partially conflicting interests. In both the legislative process and the
economic marketplace, bargains must be struck for anything to be accom-
plished, and there are significant transactions costs associated with achieving
these bargains.l°°
At a relatively abstract level, most contract and statutory interpreters share
similar goals. As a general rule, the ability of private parties engaged in
commerce to enter freely into desired commercial arrangements should be
facilitated, and not frustrated by judicial interference with the parties' manifest
Professor Brudney notes that the arguments for recognizing a "benign fiction" that legislators rely on
explanations in legislative history concerning the effect that pending legislation may have on prior
judicial decisions are even "more legitimate and realistic," Brudney, supra note 81, at 79, although
Justice Scalia has expressly rejected such recognition, see Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
97. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 28.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 29 (endorsing, without any support, canon assuming Congress intends to preserve state
prerogatives).
100. See McNollgast, supra note 16, at 708.
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agreement; likewise elected legislators should be able to effectuate their policy
preferences through legislation, and not have their manifest agreement as to
policy frustrated by a judge's personal views about the meaning of the text.1 '
As Professors McNollgast explain:
Much like the canons of contract law, canons of statutory interpretation
should decrease rather than increase the costs bargainers face in trying to
reach an agreement and should expand rather than reduce the range of issues
over which agreements can be reached. If the legislative process is more
efficient and if conflicting factions can reach accord on a broader range of
issues, political leaders will be able to achieve their objectives more effec-
tively. 
1 0 2
The aim of both contract and statutory interpretation is to ascertain the
meaning of the words used by the writing's creator. In each context, meaning
cannot be derived without considering all objective evidence of the intent of the
parties who wrote the document, including the context in which the writing was
created. 10 3 Theories that support the legitimacy of the free commercial market
and the primacy of the elected legislature suggest that, in each instance, the
purpose of interpretation is to effectuate the manifest intent of the parties who
created the writing. 04
101. The freedom of the marketplace and the freedom of the legislature are, of course, both subject
to substantive constraints. Laws or regulations can preempt the ability of parties to make certain
agreements by declaring them illegal; constitutions preempt the ability of legislatures to effectuate
certain policies in a similar manner.
For purposes of this analysis, we put aside the practice of judges interpreting the text in a manner not
originally agreed to by the drafters, either pursuant to the doctrine of course of performance, U.C.C. §
2-208(2), or using the technique of dynamic statutory interpretation, see, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S.
309 (1968) (reasoning that, although legislative history of 1935 Social Security Act showed clear intent
to allow states to deny welfare benefits on basis of "moral character," subsequent changes in attitudes
and administrative determinations justified holding that Act forbade such practices in 1968). As the
leading academic exponent of dynamic interpretation demonstrates, the latter approach involves a
pragmatic "fusion" of original concerns with modern ones, a technique that inevitably requires resort to
extrinsic aids such as legislative history. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 609, 665 (1990).
102. McNollgast, supra note 16, at 716. Synthesizing the insights of Corbin and McNollgast, when
judges limit their consideration to text and ignore reliable indicia of the parties' manifest intent, the
result will be inefficient: public policies that would otherwise be enacted because they have the
requisite democratic political support will not be effectuated because legislators are unwilling to either
take the risk that the courts will misconstrue their intent or to engage in the costly effort to reduce this
uncertainty through further negotiation about textual provisions that anticipate and countermand feared
judicial interpretations. See id. at 709..
103. See id. at 736, 738 (use of legislative history and other extrinsic aids identifying the prevailing
coalition behind successful legislation can "reduce the potential for arbitrariness and allow courts to
play a valuable role in interpreting statutes by relying on indicia to gain evidence of a statute's
meaning").
104. See Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political History, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 242, 248 (1998) (writing that the use of legislative history is one of the means that
post-Lochner judges show their acceptance of the primacy of the legislature and that law's legitimacy
derives from politics, not judicial reasoning from abstract premises).
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Significant similarities are also apparent in the rationales for using external
aids to interpret both types of text. Such aids provide a context that helps the
factfinder understand the significance the parties may have attached to the
writing. In contract interpretation, the context is often found in the oral state-
ments the parties made during the negotiations leading to the formation of the
contract. Likewise, in statutory construction, context can be found by examining
the legislative history leading to the passage of the statute. Legislative history is
thus properly understood as a form of parol evidence that documents the
creation of the writing and can be used to explain and aid in its interpretation.
There are also obvious parallels between the textualist modes of interpreta-
tion in both contract and statute interpretation. Williston and Justice Scalia both
rely on a judge's characterization of the structure and logic of the text at issue
and on a judge's view of the plain meaning of the text and dictionary defini-
tions. When those avenues fail, each will resort to interpretive canons to provide
insight into the meaning of the text. Finally, each rejects extrinsic manifesta-
tions of the parties' subjective intent in favor of other interpretive tools.
There are also similarities in the rationales proffered to exclude this extrinsic
evidence. Those who would exclude parol evidence in contract interpretation
raise the following concerns: (1) the fear of perjured testimony and faded
memories; (2) distrust of juries, who, it is feared, will be improperly swayed by
unreliable parol evidence in contradiction to the agreed upon text; and (3) the
need to insulate writings protected by the statute of frauds from oral testimony,
which is not so protected.' 05 Somewhat similarly, the reasons for refusing to
rely on legislative history include distrust of judges, a desire to insulate statutes
from outside influences perceived to be untrustworthy, and the need to ensure
that oral agreements not included in the text do not become law. (In this view,
the constitutional process for passing legislation is analogous to the Statute of
Frauds.) In both instances, the written word is viewed as having paramount
significance by the proponents of exclusion. 10 6 On the other hand, in each
context, those who defend the use of extrinsic aids have insisted that careful use
of this evidence is preferred to its exclusion and the inevitable use of even less
reliable means of interpretation.
In this Part, we first identify various factors that make the case for using
extrinsic evidence stronger in interpreting statutes than in the contract law area.
The case for the use of legislative history, we suggest, is even more compelling
than Corbin's argument for parol evidence because: (1) legislative history can
be employed by a court without the need for a jury trial to resolve disputed oral
105. For a complete commentary, see McCormick, supra note 36.
106. For example, Judge Alex Kozinski shares our view that contract and statutory interpretation are
analogous, although he reaches completely opposite conclusions as to how the analogy should be
applied. Kozinski is a noted critic of Justice Traynor's liberalization of the parol evidence. See supra
note 36. He also challenged the use of legislative history in Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539,
1559-60 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., concurring). Kozinski complained that legislative history can be
cited to support almost any proposition and frequently is. He went on to announce that the potential for
abuse is great and that judges should heed Justice Scalia's warnings about the use of legislative reports.
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testimony; (2) legislative history is necessary to protect legislative prerogatives
from the increasing use of presumptions generated by judges out of their own
philosophies; and, (3) as a default rule, the use of legislative history for
legislative drafting is more desirable for facilitating democratic policymaking
than the use of textualism as a default. We next examine some superficial
differences between contracts and legislation-multiplicity of parties, the role
of the President, and fair notice to affected parties-concluding that these
differences do not justify a textualist approach. Nor, we conclude, is the goal of
effectuating the drafters' intent more important in contract law. Finally, we
consider formalist objections to legislative history. Whatever their merit, we
conclude that they require a remarkable degree of judicial activism that is
inconsistent with Justice Scalia's stated goal of restraining judicial discretion.
A. INSTANCES IN WHICH THE CASE FOR THE USE OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
IS STRONGER IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
There are, of course, significant differences between contracts and statutes. In
a number of respects, however, these differences make the textualist position
even weaker in the statutory realm than it is in the contract area, where Corbin
and his allies have prevailed.
1. Oral Versus Written Extrinsic Evidence and Resolution Through Summary
Judgment
Williston was extremely concerned that the actual agreement of the contract-
ing parties could be frustrated if either perjured or mistaken testimony of a
verbal understanding led to a different conclusion from that which would be
reached by a judge limited to the four corners of the contract. ' 07 This concern is
alleviated in the statutory realm because the sources of legislative history
traditionally relied upon-committee hearings and debates, reports, floor de-
bates' ° 8-are all written, and therefore do not raise the specter of distorted or
faded memory. Moreover, the courts have demonstrated an ability to discount
legislative history that is simply unreliable t0 9
Because parties engaged in contract litigation will often disagree about the
107. See WILLISTON, supra note 11, § 633, at 1819-22.
108. We exclude from this discussion the reliance on post-enactment affidavits of legislators
averring as to their intent. We agree that this practice raises significant reliability problems. See Covalt
v. Carey Canada Inc., 860 F.2d 1434, 1439 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J.).
109. See, e.g., Continental Can Co.v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers U.
(Indep.) Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussed in detail infra note 138); Monterey
Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 743 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1984) (rejecting clear
and express floor statement by House manager of conference report, where textual provision at issue
originated in Senate, whose conferees insisted on its inclusion in final bill, and Senators had already
passed bill and had no opportunity to respond to comments). Modern technology inhibits the ability of
legislators to effectively abuse the legislative record. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 82, at 423-24 n.136
(recounting an attempt by House conferee to misstate intent of Conference Committee refuted in Senate
debate by Senate conferee after staff attorney watched House debate on C-SPAN).
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content of any oral agreements or representations, a party might find it easy to
avoid summary judgment by pointing to a disputed issue of fact concerning the
interpretation of a contract. Indeed, this seems to be the principal basis of
modern criticisms of the liberal parol evidence rule." ° These criticisms are
undercut in the statutory realm because even complicated disputes about the
significance of the phrasing of a committee report or a statement made during
the floor debates are susceptible of judgment without trial.
2. Judge Versus Jury
Disputes that arise in interpreting contracts are often deemed to be issues of
fact to be resolved by the jury,"' whereas statutory interpretation is a matter of
law. This distinction has several implications for the relative validity of the
textualist position. As a matter of accuracy, there is arguably a greater need for
extrinsic evidence to aid a judge's interpretation than a jury's interpretation. A
jury that is conscientiously trying to effectuate the parties' manifest intent is less
likely to be biased, given that the jury is composed of a number of participants
who bring many different perspectives to the interpretive process. Meanwhile,
the likelihood that a judge will simply fall back on her own subjective views
12
is enhanced because there is no other interpreter to challenge the perspective
she brings to the case.
Admittedly, this view is counter-conventional: many judges and commenta-
tors fear that juries will deliberately or subconsciously seize upon unreliable
parol evidence in order to find for the more sympathetic party. 1 3 But we
suspect that this concern is largely due to the oral nature of much parol
evidence. The paradigmatic case is one in which a large corporation sues a
sympathetic buyer of goods and the buyer provides unsubstantiated testimony
of an oral agreement that excuses her failure to pay. Juryphobes, we suggest, are
(or at least should be) less concerned that a jury will misconstrue what the
110. See, e.g., Trident Ctr. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988);
FARNSWORTH, supra note 13, at 520; Olivia W. Karlin & Louis W. Karlin, The California Parol
Evidence Rule, 21 Sw. U. L. REv. 1361 (1992).
111. See WILLISTON, supra note 11, at 616.
112. See CORBIN, supra note 15, § 542, at Il.
113. See Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641, 644-45 (2d Cir. 1943) (Frank, J.) (holding that
parol evidence of alleged contract admissible, noting that the "most important reason for the perpetua-
tion of the [parol evidence] rule is distrust of juries") (citing McCormick, supra note 36), rev'd per
curiam, 322 U.S. 709 (1944). The Supreme Court reversed without opinion. Four justices found that
testimony concerning the contract was barred by the parol evidence rule, two justices agreed with Judge
Frank on this point, and three justices found the contract to obtain war supplies orders for the defendant
on commission, even if proven, was void as contrary to public policy. Id.
Whether or not these fears are justified, cf. Mooney, supra note 44, at 1147 ("judging by reported
decisions at least, the parol evidence rule seemed actually to assist more dissemblers than it thwarted"),
the perceived hostility of juries to large businesses may lead those businesses to utilize standard written
contracts that reflect the firm's desire to fully incorporate the bargain in a written document. To the
extent that the firm insists that a complete written integration is the only way it will do business, barring
parol evidence effectuates the actual intent of the parties. In contrast, it appears that Congress does not
usually intend that courts exclude legislative history from their consideration.
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parties meant by, for example, a letter written by the corporation's agent to the
buyer explaining the meaning of clause 157 in the contract. For us, the
paradigmatic case is Gianni v. R. Russel & Co., in which the judges found that a
written contract between a landlord and an unsophisticated tenant was the sort
that reasonable people would find to be complete; a jury would be much more
likely to believe that the parties had indeed reached a separate oral understand-
ing concerning the exclusive nature of the rights conferred upon the tenant. "14
3. Use of Normative Versus Descriptive Canons 115
In both contract and statutory contexts, textualists advocate the use of canons
or maxims as a methodology for resolving otherwise difficult interpretive
problems. These canons fall into two categories: descriptive canons and norma-
tive canons. Descriptive canons are based on the way ordinary people express
themselves in English. They attempt, through generalizations, to approximate
the probable intent of the drafters. 1 6 Many contract rules that imply terms
omitted by the parties (so-called "default rules") represent efforts to provide the
parties to a contract with "what they would have contracted for." 1 17 Several
important canons in contract law resolve interpretive questions against the party
responsible for creating the interpretive difficulty in the first place. For example,
where a written contract was entirely drafted by one party, courts will often
resolve ambiguities against the drafter." 8 Courts will also construe terms
against the party that acted less reasonably-for example, the seller who knew
the buyer had a contrary interpretation of a term but did nothing to clarify the
ambiguity. 1 9 Although these descriptive canons can certainly be misused, their
114. The case is discussed in detail in supra text accompanying note 36.
115. For an explanation and differentiation of normative and descriptive canons, see Stephen E
Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND.
L. Rav. 561, 563 (1992).
116. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 13, § 7.11 at 518; JAMES WILLARD HuRST, DEALING WITH
STATUTES 56 (1982).
117. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989). Many of those who more aggressively advocate default rules
that are economically efficient still couch their argument in terms of "what arrangements would most
bargainers prefer?" Id. at 92 (quoting Charles Goertz & Robert Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward
a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 971 (1983)).
118. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 13, § 7.11, at 518.
119. Most law students recall the famous case of Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales
Corp., 190 F Supp. 116 (1960), in which the court found that the term "chicken" in the contract was
objectively unclear and held that the plaintiff could not prevail on its interpretation because its own
understanding "may not have been sufficiently brought home" to the defendant. Id. at 121.
Professor Corbin criticized a portion of the court's reasoning, in which Judge Friendly first found that
the word "chicken" standing alone was ambiguous, and then found the word in the context of the entire
written contract to be similarly unclear. See id. at 118. In Corbin's view, the "word chicken did not
stand alone; and whatever meanings (if any) it might have standing alone, do not determine the issue"
because the word was used in context of other words. Corbin, supra note 12, at 165. Moreover, the case
for admissibility of parol evidence is demonstrated because, according to Corbin, the contract text
might well have seemed plain were Corbin the judge. Corbin had spent ten years on a Kansas farm
feeding chickens, and recalled the famous 1928 presidential campaign slogan "a chicken in every pot"
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focus on grammar and context is designed to inhibit a judge's personal bias in
the interpretive process. Most significantly, under the Corbin approach, parol
evidence of the parties' manifest intent is admissible and, if deemed reliable,
will prevail over these interpretive canons. 120 Similarly, only the most rigid
statutory textualists refuse to consult legislative history that demonstrates that
the empirical generalizations underlying a descriptive canon were not operative
in the case at hand.'
2 1
The second group of canons, referred to as "substantive," "policy," or
"normative" canons, resolve interpretive difficulties based on how the canon's
creator (whether legislator or judge) believes the matter ought to have been
resolved by the drafters, regardless of their actual intent. For example, various
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code assign the risk of loss, if not
specifically addressed by the parties, to the party most capable of avoiding the
loss or most able to distribute the risk of loss efficiently. 122 Similarly, courts
have historically given narrow interpretations to statutes in derogation of the
common law, even though there is no basis for supposing that legislators
necessarily had a particularly high regard for the common law.' 2 3 Today, the
Supreme Court requires Congress to speak with utmost clarity before it will
interpret a federal statute in a way that limits state prerogatives, refusing to
consider even crystalline nontextual indicia of what Congress actually in-
tended. 1
24
and therefore did not attribute the narrow meaning (poultry capable of broiling or frying) asserted by
the buyer. Nonetheless, Corbin wrote, his own background would not have justified the exclusion of
other extrinsic evidence. See id. at 166.
120. See, e.g., Scott Galvanizing, Inc. v. Northwest EnviroServices, Inc., 844 P.2d 428 (Wash. 1993)
(rules of construction should not be applied except where the intent of the parties cannot be discerned
from the circumstances and considerations of the case, including parol evidence).
121. For example, in Llewellyn's classic article on the canons, supra note 79, the alternative to a
descriptive canon is frequently an interpretive rule that requires examination of the legislative history
for evidence of actual intent or purpose. Even a leading textualist, Judge Frank Easterbrook, acknowl-
edges the need to consult legislative history to ensure that the expresio unius canon is being applied
accurately. See In re American Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1988).
122. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 215 (3d ed. 1988). To
be sure, these are "default" rules that parties can alter. Id. at 212 (citing U.C.C. § 2-504). However,
courts are often reluctant to disturb the code-specified risk allocations. See id.
Corbin took pains to distinguish the application of these canons, which he called "construction,"
from "contract interpretation." He wrote, "[w]hen a court is filling gaps in the terms of an agreement
with respect to matters that the parties did not have in contemplation and as to which they had no
intention to be expressed, the judicial process should not be called interpretation." CORBIN, supra note
15, § 534, at 11 (1960).
123. Justice Scalia notes that this canon "seems like a sheer judicial power grab." SCALIA, supra
note 1, at 29. See also FREDERICK POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHIcs 85 (1882) (stating
that some canons "cannot well be accounted for except upon the theory that Parliament generally
changes law for the worse, and that the business of the judge is to keep the mischief of its interference
within the narrowest possible bounds").
124. See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989) (refusing to find that Congress abrogated state
sovereign immunity, despite explicit legislative history showing intent to so abrogate, and despite fact
that Supreme Court decision announcing "clear statement rule" for abrogation of sovereign immunity
not established until 1985, twelve years after passage of relevant statute).
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These normative canons are somewhat more prevalent in modem contract
law than in the traditional world that followed Williston's lead. In cases where
there was no textual evidence of agreement on key terms and provisions,
Williston was much more likely to find that there was no meeting of the minds
and thus no contract. 25 Llewellyn, in particular, successfully advocated the
enforcement of contracts with a minimum number of agreed-upon terms, at the
same time that he and others were liberalizing the parol evidence rule to
facilitate the admission of extrinsic evidence to prove that the parties actually
had a "meeting of the minds" on the relevant issue. Thus, absent evidence that
the parties intended to limit the terms of their agreement to a written contract,
courts applying the UCC would not insist upon the use of a statutory "gap-
filler" when reliable extrinsic evidence existed that the parties had actually
agreed on a resolution of a particular issue, but had neglected to include that
resolution in the written contract. 126 As Judge Posner wrote:
A completely intractable issue of contract interpretation can be resolved only
by the application of some default rule-a burden of persuasion, a clear-
meaning rule, a presumption based on the authorship of the contract. But the
time to throw up one's hands and apply such a rule is after extrinsic evidence
has been considered. For until then, we do not know whether we have an
intractable interpretive issue or merely an issue that cannot be resolved
without testimony or other evidence besides the language and logic... of the
contract. 
12 7
The increased use of normative canons to interpret statutes makes it more,
rather than less, important that judges consider extrinsic evidence of the mani-
fest intent of legislative drafters. The problematic use of normative canons by
125. For example, in Sun Printing & Publishing v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 139 N.E. 470
(N.Y. 1923) (Cardozo, J.), the court found that an agreement to agree later on price was too indefinite to
be enforced. Wifliston cited the case with approval, 1 WILLISTON, supra note 11, § 41, at 116. White and
Summers cite the case to illustrate how the UCC validates such agreements. See WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 122, §§ 3-7, at 145.
126. To illustrate, consider the various provisions of Article 2 that identify the party that should bear
the risk of loss of the goods subsequent to the signing of the contract.
Although the Code makes clear that these terms may be varied by the parties, U.C.C. § 2-504, where
the parties have agreed that the written contract is the complete integration of their agreement, and that
contract is silent on terms of risk of loss, courts are likely to reject parol evidence of a "side
agreement" on risk of loss. Rather, courts are going to assume that, by agreeing to a fully integrated
written contract silent on risk of loss provisions, the parties manifested a shared intent to have their
dealings governed by the UCC gap fillers.
However, this shared intention must be proven; the Code presumes, absent evidence to the contrary,
that the parties do not intend a written contract to be the complete integration of their agreement, and
thus terms that do not vary or contradict written terms are admissible. In such a case, since the written
contract is silent, courts would admit parol evidence that the parties agreed to allocate the risk of loss in
a manner different than that provided under the code. Indeed, even Professor Williston would, contrary
to some cited cases, admit parol evidence where it appeared that the parties had not considered the
omitted term in the written contract. WILLISTON, supra note 11, § 640, at 1839-41.
127. Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 609 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
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those claiming to be dedicated to reducing judicial interference with democratic
policymaking has been noted elsewhere. 2 8 It is particularly ironic when legisla-
tive history is compared to contract interpretation. At the same time that New
Textualist judges are increasingly relying on normative canons," 29 and also on
descriptive canons that often do not accurately describe legislative drafting
practices,' 30 many of these same judges are ignoring evidence that makes it
clear that Congress did not intend the result generated from these canons. This
practice is hardly consistent with an interpretive method designed to limit the
implementation of the "objectives and desires" of the judiciary. 1
4. Insights from Theories of Contract Default Rules
All of the approaches to extrinsic aids discussed in this article-Williston's
strict parol evidence rule, Corbin/Llewellyn's liberalized parol evidence rule,
the conventional reliance on legislative history in statutory interpretation, and
the New Textualism-are "default rules" in the sense that the relevant parties
can change the practice by explicit agreement. Even Williston would have
permitted parties to explicitly provide that their written document was not a
fully integrated contract and that any prior or contemporaneous written or
oral 32 agreements were incorporated therein. The UCC, of course, retains a
parol evidence rule that permits the parties to exclude any extrinsic evidence.
Although Justice Scalia has found few true followers among his colleagues on
the Supreme Court, we suspect that they all would give effect to an explicit
statutory provision that directed the courts to disregard legislative history in
interpreting the statute. Even Justice Scalia would accept "snippets" from the
Congressional Record if, for example, the text of the statute explicitly declared
that the floor manager's interpretive remarks were authoritative.
One might ask, then, what the fuss is all about. If reliance on legislative
history promotes legislative supremacy (because legislators favor its authorita-
tive use by courts), 13 3 facilitates the effectuation of legislative policy prefer-
ences (by making it easier to reach bargains since the terms of the bargains can
be explained in detail in the legislative history), 134 and, as this article has
argued, inhibits judges from interpreting statutes based on their own back-
ground and policy preferences, it should be a simple enough matter for Con-
gress to enact legislation instructing the courts to use legislative history.
128. See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 28; Ross, supra note 115, at 563-66 (1992).
129. See e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99. Illuminating empirical research has found that
Congress is much more likely to override plain meaning decisions of the Supreme Court than any other
type of statutory decision. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpreta-
tion Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 348 (1991).
131. Cf SCALIA, supra note 1, at 18.
132. Of course, oral agreements are subject to the Statute of Frauds.
133. See Correia, supra note 82.
134. See Brudney, supra note 81, at 20-40. Cf McNollgast, supra note 16, at 710.
19981
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:195
Recent scholarship has studied the significance of the selection of particular
default rules in contract and corporate law. Professor Ian Ayres, for example,
has argued that complex standards (his example is the duty of care corporate
managers owe shareholders) are more difficult to draft than clear rules (that
corporate managers owe no duty of care to anyone). In his words, "it may be
cheaper for corporations to contract for crystals than mud." 135 Ayres concludes
that it will be more efficient to make the "muddy" standard the default rule,
because corporations that prefer no duty of care can simply say so in their
incorporating articles, whereas it is much more difficult to ask a corporation to
craft a complex standard fully contingent on future events. 
136
As applied to statutory interpretation, Ayres' insights suggest that the validity
of Justice Scalia's views is not a matter of indifference. It is not difficult to draft
a statutory provision stating that nothing in the legislative record should have
any interpretive significance, or that only some particular item should. Indeed,
in one notable case, Congress did precisely that. 137 On the other hand, courts
cannot be directed simply to give effect to "legislative history," given the
breadth of that term and the possibility that, to cite the most obvious example,
the statements of individual legislators may well not reflect the legislature's
collective intent. 138 Trying to draft statutory language that accurately specifies
135. Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 51
U. CHI. L. REv. 1391, 1405 (1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FIsHR, THE
ECONOMIC STRuCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991)). These artful metaphors are borrowed from Carol M.
Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577 (1988).
136. Ayres, supra note 135, at 1405.
137. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), § 105(b),
discussed at supra note 87 and accompanying text.
138. Although some suggest that statements by individual participants in the legislative process
"should be accorded no weight," McNollgast, supra note 16, at 726, we believe that the issue is a bit
more complex, which exemplifies our point in the text that drafting a statute telling courts to use
"reliable" legislative history is much "muddier" than telling courts not to use any legislative history if
that is Congress's preference. A thoughtful opinion by Judge Easterbrook, Continental Can Co. v.
Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers U. (Indep.) Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154 (7th
Cir. 1990), is illustrative. In that case, Continental claimed it was eligible to be covered by a special
ERISA provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(2) (1980), which was available only if "substantially all of the
contributions required under the [pension] plan are made by employers primarily engaged in the long
and short haul trucking industry." The court disagreed, finding that "substantially all" meant 85%, a
threshold Continental did not meet. In so holding, the court relied on the consistent application of the
85% threshold to give meaning to the same phrase in most tax statutes. Significantly, the court also
relied on an "individual statement" made on the House floor by the House manager of the bill (Rep.
Thompson), urging acceptance of the Senate amendment that contained this exception, noting that he
intended "substantially all" to mean 85%, and observing that this was the common use of the phrase by
the IRS. See Continental Can, 916 F.2d at 1156. The court rejected, however, a subsequent statement,
inserted into the Congressional Record but not stated on the Senate floor, by an individual Senator (Sen.
Durenberger), indicating his view that the provision applied if a majority of the assets were contributed
by trucking companies. Judge Easterbrook explained:
Although Senator Durenberger was "amazed" that anyone would dare to interpret language
he had not written, we do not view Representative Thompson's speech as an exercise in
temerity. The Senate amended H.R. 3904 and wanted the House to accept its revisions.
Members of the House were entitled to form their own understanding of the language before
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which portions of the legislative history accurately reflect the legislators' intent
is much more difficult than language that excludes all history.
To be sure, a legislature could respond to Ayres' concerns by simply drafting
a provision instructing the courts to enforce "mud." Returning to Ayres' ex-
ample, crafting a duty of care may be difficult, but a provision could easily be
added to the articles of incorporation providing that directors "exercise that
duty of care found reasonable by the courts under past and future Delaware
legal precedents." Applying this standard to statutes, Congress could simply add
a general or bill-specific provision directing courts to interpret statutes "based
on the manifest intention of the legislators as revealed in both the statute's text
and those portions of the legislative record that appear to reliably reflect
congressional intent."
A recent work by Professor Russell Korobkin explains, however, why this
response is inadequate. Korobkin demonstrates that parties tend to develop a
preference for whatever default rule is adopted, simply because it is the status
quo. 139 He suggests several reasons for this phenomenon. First, the party that
seeks to displace the default rule may be viewed by the opposing party as
behaving strategically, thus creating distrust in the negotiation process. Second,
people are generally risk-averse; they tend to worry about the adverse conse-
quences of their positive actions rather than the potential consequences of
inaction.
Consider these insights in the context of a hypothetical drafting session where
deciding whether to enact it. Words do not have meanings given by natural law. You don't
have to be Ludwig Wittgenstein or Hans-Georg Gadamer to know that successful communica-
tion depends on meanings shared by interpretive communities.... If Senator Durenberger
wanted to see whether his colleagues would agree to an amendment exempting funds the
majority of which came from the trucking industry, he had only to propose words such as
"majority" or "50.1%" or "more than half" or "most". Instead he chose a formula with a
known meaning and tipped into the Congressional Record a novel interpretation.
Id. at 1157-58.
In contrast, floor colloquies reflected a shared understanding of legislation by known opponents is a
particularly reliable form of legislative history. See, e.g., Hatch, supra note 8, at 48 (stating that
"whenever Senator Metzenbaum and Senator Thurmond agree, the statement probably has the support
of the rest of the body as well"). One of us (Ross) can confirm Senator Hatch's conclusion from
first-hand experience (as Judiciary Committee counsel to Sen. Metzenbaum). In 1984, Senators
Metzenbaum and Thurmond had indeed agreed on the outlines of compromise legislation concerning
liability of municipalities for violations of the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Proposed legislation, with a host of drafting problems, was provided at Sen. Thurmond's request by the
Justice Department. Sen. Thurmond's aide persuasively argued that, in light of the extraordinary
compromise between two usual antagonists, Sen. Metzenbaum should acquiesce in the draft, and he did
so. When attorneys working for other Judiciary Committee members identified these drafting errors,
they were encouraged to have their employers raise these issues. Invariably, as soon as these other
senators were informed that the draft in question had been agreed to by Thurmond and Metzenbaum,
the discussion was ended and no further action was taken. (Eventually, the Local Government Antitrust
Act of 1984 more closely resembled the bill that was drafted by counsel for the House Judiciary
Committee.).
139. See Russell B. Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contractual Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L.
REv. 608 (1998).
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staff counsel to Senators Edward Kennedy and Strom Thurmond are drafting
legislation to reflect a compromise to which these prominent and ideologically
opposed senators have agreed. Assume that neither of them has any particular
reason to object to the courts' subsequent use of the legislative history; indeed,
virtually every staffer has had the experience of facilitating a legislative bargain
by drafting a paragraph for the committee report that clearly explains the
meaning of a statutory provision to the satisfaction of all concerned parties.'
40
Now assume, instead, that Kennedy and Thurmond instruct their staffers to
assume that the New Textualist method of interpretation will govern.14' After a
while, suppose that the Thurmond staffer suggests that the text of the statute
contain a provision that specifically instructs the courts to look to the legislative
history in interpreting the statute. Korobkin's thesis would predict (correctly, in
our view) that this suggestion would have two effects. First, Kennedy's staffer
would wonder what parts of the legislative history Thurmond's lawyer was so
interested in, and would begin to suspect some opportunistic behavior on
Thurmond's part. Second, the Kennedy staffer might well reject Thurmond's
proposal, and insist that no legislative history be used, for fear that some portion
of the committee report she had written might be used against Kennedy's
ideological position in later litigation, even though she would have considered
the use of legislative history unobjectionable had the default rule been the
opposite.
Professor Ayres has also suggested that, in order to promote both equity and
efficiency in contracting, default rules be established to facilitate the sharing of
information by the parties.' 42 In a sense, this proposal is an elaboration of the
general contract law principle that resolves ambiguities against the party that
has acted less reasonably in creating or failing to resolve the ambiguity during
the negotiation process, 143 and at first glance it may appear to support excluding
extrinsic evidence as a means of encouraging the parties to manifest their
agreement in the plain words of the written text.144 In the contract context,
combining a host of specific default rules with the parol evidence rule means
that parties content to abide by the operative default rules can remain silent; if
both parties are satisfied with these rules, they can then comfortably agree to
exclude parol evidence with some confidence about how judges will fill in any
gaps in the contract. Thus, the parol evidence rule arguably serves the desirable
140. See supra note 138 (reliability of floor colloquies between opposing leaders on issue); supra
note 81 (deliberate legislative choice to use broad statutory language with narrative explanation of
text's meaning in committee report).
141. During House Judiciary Committee negotiations on a 1991 anticrime bill, Rep. Barney Frank
warned colleagues not to resolve a dispute by putting explanatory language in a committee report. He
used just two words: "Justice Scalia," then said the committee report might ultimately be judged
irrelevant. See Joan Biskupic, Scalia Sees No Justice in Trying to Judge Intent of Congress on a Law,
WASH. POST, May 11, 1993, at A4.
142. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 117.
143. See, e.g., Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (1960).
144. See Mooney, supra note 44, at 1146.
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function of encouraging parties to incorporate into the contract's text all under-
standings that are not consistent with operative gap-fillers. 145 However, there
are no such universal gapfilling default rules for statutes. Permitting legislators
to rely on narrative explanations of the meaning of complex textual provisions
seems to best facilitate the sharing of information.
Barring courts from examining the bargaining history of a contract or a
statute has costs and benefits. Most obviously, the exclusion of extrinsic evi-
dence increases the risk that the court will not interpret the text in the way that
the parties intended, and that the parties will have to engage in more costly and
time-consuming negotiation over the text to minimize this risk. The benefit of
exclusion is that this costly exercise may reduce the likelihood of erroneous
interpretation, both because the text will be more precise and because the courts
will not be misled by unreliable extrinsic evidence, and reduce the costs
incurred by lawyers and judges who will be freed from the need to research
legislative history. 146 The goals of preserving free markets and democratic
legislating suggests that the parties ought to be able to determine for themselves
when the cost-benefit analysis tips in favor of the exclusion of extrinsic evi-
dence. '
4 7
Taken together, the insights of these default rule theorists suggest that the
145. Thanks to Marie Reilly for this insight.
146. See Movsesian, supra note 81, at 1185-88. In a general critique of the analogy made in this
part, Professor Movsesian highlights the difficulties in the task of discovering reliable legislative
history. Movsesian develops a dichotomy between the hard-to-discover "intended meaning" of a statute
and the easy-for-judges-to-identify "actual meaning" or "objective" reading of the statutory text. Id. at
1149, 1182. As this article suggests, how judges will interpret the "actual" or "objective" reading is
often more unreliable than extrinsic evidence, a point that Corbin developed and that legislators today
recognize.
147. A recent work that analyzes the costs and benefits of textualist and non-textualist approaches
implies that, at least in the contract setting, most parties prefer the exclusion of extrinsic evidence based
on the observation that parties rarely include anti-merger clauses in contracts negotiated in those
jurisdictions with a strict parol evidence rule. Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, The Plain
Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 571 (1998).
Professor Posner does not assert that the use of merger clauses is significantly higher in states that
routinely admit extrinsic evidence. In any event, Professor Korobkin's work, supra note 139, casts
doubt on the significance of this empirical inquiry, because of the disruptive effect on negotiations of a
party's request to insert anti-merger clauses where the default rule provides for the exclusion of
extrinsic evidence.
Professor Posner suggests that the parol evidence rule should be strictly applied in categories of cases
where the transaction costs of including prior or contemporaneous agreements in the written contract
are low and where the risk of judicial error is high. See Posner, supra, at 550. However, if the parties
are aware that the transaction costs are low and judicial error is likely, it is not clear why they cannot be
relied upon to include in the written contract a clear manifestation of their agreement that extrinsic
evidence should be excluded, a manifestation that Corbin, Llewellyn, and other proponents of extrinsic
evidence would enforce. To the extent that the parties might seek to exclude extrinsic evidence
concerning some terms, but not others, see id. at 551, this too could be provided for in a negotiated
merger clause. Posner's claim that Corbin "mistakenly assumes that the parties' intentions cannot also
include a preference against judicial evaluation of extrinsic evidence," see id. at 570 n.69, is only true
in the sense that Corbin would always review extrinsic evidence of that alleged exclusionary prefer-
ence.
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
case for a rebuttable presumption in favor of using legislative history in
statutory interpretation is even stronger than it is in the case of using parol
evidence in contract interpretation. In both the contract and the statutory
context, a textual ban on the use of extrinsic evidence is more crystalline, and
thus Ayres' insights suggest that the default rule should permit reliance on
extrinsic evidence. This is especially true in the statutory area. A contract clause
expressly incorporating prior or contemporaneous agreements or understandings
is easier to draft than a clause effectuating Congress's "muddy" desire to have
the courts use reliable legislative history. In addition, contract negotiations will
more frequently center on the insertion or exclusion of standard clauses; the
parties have a very clear understanding of the meaning judges are likely to give
to those clauses, and are primarily haggling over rival clauses that benefit one
side or another. Although this is a generalization, legislative negotiations more
frequently involve individually drafted statutory provisions, where it is harder to
predict what meaning the courts will give to the text and thus more need for use
of explanatory narrative.
B. SUPERFICIAL DIFFERENCES THAT DO NOT DISTINGUISH STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION SUFFICIENTLY TO JUSTIFY NEW TEXTUALISM
There are other important ways in which the negotiation, implementation,
and interpretation of contracts differ from the statutory context. However, on
close analysis, these differences do nothing to weaken the analogy between
contract and statutory interpretation; they do not lessen the applicability of the
consensus in contract law that the exclusion of extrinsic evidence facilitates
judicial discretion, often resulting in the substitution of the judgment of the
judge for that of the drafters, and making it difficult for drafters to accomplish
their purposes.
1. Multiplicity of Parties
Most contracts involve only two parties, and the type of extrinsic evidence
that manifests these parties' intent is often relatively straightforward. Con-
versely, statutes typically require the assent of a majority of Congress as well as
the President. Thus, it could be argued that extrinsic evidence indicating the
views of a committee or a bill's sponsor does -not provide the same sort of
reliable indicia of intent. 
148
Admittedly, the task of reviewing a statute's legislative history to ensure that
it reliably reflects the collective legislative intent adds a level of complexity to
the interpretive process that is not present in many contract cases. However, this
complexity should not be exaggerated. Multiparty contracts are not uncommon-
collective bargaining agreements between management and labor unions are a
classic example. In construing these contracts, bargaining history is often
148. See the discussion of this point at supra text accompanying notes 55-56 (citing SCALIA, supra
note 1, at 32 and Radin, supra note 55, at 870).
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critical. 149 Over sixty years ago, Dean Landis responded to Professor Radin's
attack on the notion of collective intent by conceding that
even in a large representative assembly the debate on statutes passed by it will
not call forward external utterances or significant behavior on the part of
'hundreds of men.' Rarely does a debate evoke more than a handful, and the
yea and nay votes of the non-participants by every reasonable intendment
must be taken to adopt their views."
5
0
Moreover, the critical role played by committees and floor sponsors in shaping




2. The Role of the President
The role of the President in the statutory process may appear to have no
equivalent in the contract law arena. Arguably, legislative history cannot reflect
the collective intent of the relevant "parties" because the President is unlikely
to have had any real say in that legislative history. But this characterization of
the legislative process is not entirely valid. While the President may not
formally create legislative history, he or she has the ability to influence the
legislative process by eliciting the support of a legislator to make specific
arguments during the floor debates or by using a representative of an executive
branch agency to testify about a bill during congressional hearings.1 52 In
addition, the administration's interpretation of a bill's language can easily be
distributed to legislators and inserted into the Congressional Record by the
President's legislative allies. In extreme cases, the President can threaten to or
actually veto legislation if the legislative history suggests that Congress intends
a result the President finds unacceptable. As a result, the President can and does
contribute to the creation of legislative history, and the legislative process is
correctly analogized to a three-party contract negotiation.
3. Notice to Affected Parties
For years, critics of the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation
have argued that reliance on committee reports and floor debates available for
publication only in libraries that are government depositories is not fair to a
149. See James E. Westbrook, A Comparison of the Interpretation of Statutes and Collective
Bargaining Agreements: Grasping the Pivot of Tao, 60 Mo. L. REv. 283, 307 (1995).
150. Landis, supra note 14, at 888-89 n.7 (internal citations omitted). Landis recognized that no such
assumption could be made about representatives of the other legislative body, see id., but this did not
detract from the principal point.
151. See, e.g., McNollgast, supra note 16.
152. See, e.g., Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 135-36 (1983) (relying on
testimony at committee hearings by President Wilson's adviser, Louis Brandeis); Kathryn Marie
Dessayer, Note, The First Word: The President's Place in "Legislative History", 89 MIcH. L. REv. 399
(1990).
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citizenry that is supposed to rely on the "rule of law."' 153 These critics would
presumably be unimpressed with the insights of Corbin and others concerning
the need for extrinsic evidence in contract interpretation because the parties
bound by the contract are obviously familiar with that evidence.
The principal problem with this critique is that it assumes a world that no
longer exists, if it ever did. Very few statutes outside the criminal area operate
directly on uninformed individuals. Modem statutes are enormously complex
and cannot be interpreted or complied with without the assistance of a lawyer
who is likely to have relatively easy access to either the actual legislative
history or to treatises written by experts intimately familiar with that history.
Moreover, most statutes are mediated by implementing agencies. Surely the
agency lawyers and the firms whose work is directly affected by the agency
have similar access to and familiarity with legislative materials. 1
54
Indeed, the recognition that most of those who are actually affected by a
statute have ready access to-and often participated in creating-the legislative
record actually strengthens the argument for the use of extrinsic aids. In contract
negotiations, many thorny interpretive issues are left unresolved because neither
party wants to signal that it is considering, or worried about, having a business
relationship end up in litigation. 155 In contrast, committee counsel and lawyer-
lobbyists constantly engage in careful negotiations concerning the exact word-
ing of a statute and its legislative history precisely because they anticipate
litigation over the meaning of the statute.156 Thus, reliable indicia of how the
drafters intended specific interpretive problems to be resolved is more likely to
exist in the record of legislative negotiations than contract negotiations. Signifi-
cantly, in one prominent example of a contract negotiation process that is
conducted with the expectation of future litigation-collective bargaining agree-
ments between unions and management that will be enforced through arbitra-
tion-bargaining history is commonly used as a tool for contract interpretation. 1
57
When contracts create rights in nonparties (third party beneficiaries), these
parties are, like nonlegislators in relation to statutes, not immediately privy to
extrinsic evidence. Here, the focus of the Restatement is on whether it would be
"reasonable" for the third party to rely on the contract "as manifesting an
intention to confer a right upon him." 15 Although it has been suggested that
153. See, e.g., United States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396-97 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting). For a detailed discussion of this issue and response to prominent critics like Justice
Jackson, see DICKERSON, supra note 25, at 147-51.
154. See Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369
(1989). For an expanded discussion of this point, see Ross, supra note 82, at 1061-63 (1995).
155. See Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDisc. L.J. 59,
70-71 (1993); Korobkin, supra note 139.
156. Consider the example of the National Cooperative Research Act, discussed supra note 81.
157. See Westbrook, supra note 149.
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 cmt. d.
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this analogy counsels against the use of extrinsic evidence, 59 it appears that
where, as is usually the case, a reasonable third party would itself, or through
counsel, be familiar with the legislative history, that the manifest intent of the
legislature, as expressed in that history, would be binding on the outside party.
4. Anti-intentionalism in Statutory Interpretation
Text is arguably a more essential part of a statute than a contract. A written
contract memorializes an agreement, rather than constituting it.' 60 Thus, extrin-
sic evidence of what the parties' contractual agreement really was is arguably
more compelling than evidence of legislative intent.
This argument is not without force. However, if the actual intent of the
legislature (or, to be precise, the leading legislators who were directly involved
in passage of the legislation and whose views were likely shared, or acquiesced
in, by the majority that supported the bill) is to be jettisoned as an interpretive
anchor, the question becomes what replaces that anchor. Certainly if the goal of
statutory interpretation is to prevent judges from pursuing their "own objectives
and desires," "under the guise or even the self-delusion of perusing unex-
pressed legislative intents," 161 it is difficult to justify the refusal to use extrinsic
aids to guide and limit judicial discretion.
Clearly, Corbin's insights are most relevant for those who would substitute
the "objective meaning" of statutory text for the actual intent of the legislature.
Judges left to their own devices are far too likely to reach interpretive results in
accord with their own backgrounds and prejudices. 162 A well-meaning judge
159. See Movsesian, supra note 81, at 1175. To be precise, Movsesian says this analogy counsels
against "importing intentionalism wholesale into statutory interpretation." This passage again reveals
Movsesian's erroneous equation of the use of extrinsic aids with subjective intentionalism. See id.
160. Special thanks to Dan Farber for his excellent phrasing of this argument.
161. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 17-18.
162. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARv. L. REV. 43, 59
(1989) (suggesting that the conservative Court in the 1988 term used whatever justification was
necessary to achieve preferred outcomes); Pierce, supra note 82, at 780-81 (analysis of textualist
administrative law decisions during recent term shows almost all to reach conservative ideological
results); Ross, supra note 82, at 422-23 (noting four examples of recent cases where justices' view of
plain meaning corresponded to predicted ideological view of desired result in the case sub judice);
Wald, supra note 70, at 304-05 (rejection of legislative history resulted in attribution of intent to
Congress "without apparent source other than the writing judge's mindset"); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, the Two Faces of Ultra-Pluralism, and the Originalist Fallacy, 25 RUTGERs L.J. 679,
679 (1994) (arguing that Chief Justice Rehnquist's statutory interpretation decisions coincide with his
political preferences).
Corbin complained of cases where a majority held that words were "plain and clear" even though
dissenting colleagues found the text ambiguous or even attached a different "plain and clear" meaning.
CORBIN, supra note 15,.§ 542, at 122. For a stark example, see Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984)
(five-justice majority finds plain language of statute to support challenged Presidential authority; four
dissenting justices and three court of appeals justices found plain language demonstrated Presidential
authority improper). See also Pierce, supra note 82, at 752 (criticizing textualist adoption of a plain
meaning at odds with contrary view held by many other judges for years). Remarkably, few justices
reach the conclusion that language that they believed to be clear at first glance is in fact ambiguous
because of the views of their judicial colleagues. But see Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Ct., 834 P.2d
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who adopted Corbin's skepticism of "plain meaning" might then move to the
second step in Justice Scalia's proposed method of textual analysis-determin-
ing the meaning "most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which
the provision must be integrated-a compatibility which, by a benign fiction,
we assume Congress always has in mind." 163 It is by no means self-evident that
it is benign for judges to determine for themselves, unanchored to any evidence
of the legislature's policy preferences, what meaning results in the most coher-
ent corpus juris. What is clear is that such an approach is a fiction. There is no
evidence that Congress intends for the corpus juris to be coherent.' 64 Public
policy is about compromises, about resolving conflicting interests, about achiev-
ing desired policy to some extent, without unduly sacrificing some other
goal. 1
65
Although a number of academic commentators and some textualist judges
view statutes as contractual deals or bargains to be enforced by disinterested
judges, 166 this view is sharply criticized by those who believe that many statutes
are public-spirited and that judges should act as partners with the legislature in
effectuating the public purposes of legislation.1 67 While the public-regarding
approach weakens the analogy to contracts, it necessarily requires use of
legislative materials in order to permit judges to fully participate in this "repub-
1148, 1170 (Cal. 1992) (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("the very fact that [two other dissenting justices]
disagree with the majority regarding the meaning of the clause, and that both the majority and these two
justices find the clause clear, but conclude it has opposite meanings, ironically and convincingly
demonstrates that the clause is ambiguous").
163. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
164. We therefore distinguish these "benign fictions" from contract law concepts like trade usage.
Although in any particular commercial case it is possible that the parties were unfamiliar with trade
practices about which a judge thinks they should have been familiar, the interpretive weight given to
trade usage necessarily includes the factual assumption that in most cases, merchants in an industry will
actually be familiar with these common practices. No equivalent empirical generalization is possible for
the notion that the statutory corpusjuris should be coherent.
165. See Heath v. Varity Corp., 71 F.3d 256, 258 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J.) (reversing district
court effort to interpret a statute in a coherent manner, noting that "[tiensions among statutory
provisions are common. Legislation reflects compromise among competing interests"); Boise Cascade
Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127, 1158-59 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Mikva, J., dissenting) (castigating majority for
failing to recognize inherent tension between two antitrust statutes, suggesting majority "mistakenly
equates clearheadedness with singlemindedness," noting that Congress often enacts inconsistent stat-
utes and judicial role is not to "legislate a consistency that Congress did not enact").
166. See, e.g., MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLrTCAL MARKETS
(1981); William Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975). Then-Professor Frank Easterbrook allowed that not all
statutes were like contracts, but advocated a contract-like approach for those that bear the markings of
special interest deals. See The Supreme Court 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1984). Cf Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667, 671-72 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.) (courts should read antitrust exemptions
with "beady eyes and green eyeshades"). For a nice summary of this perspective, see William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era,
48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 691, 702-10 (1987).
167. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1991); Macey, supra note 82; Strauss, supra note 82.




Finally, the New Textualists have raised a formidable constitutional objection
to reliance on external evidence in interpreting statutes: the use of legislative
history effectively allows participants in committee hearings, members of com-
mittees, and individual legislators to enact "law" without going through the
constitutionally mandated legislative process requiring a majority vote in both
houses and presentment to the President. 1
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At first glance, this argument appears to be a canard. Few nontextualists
suggest that extrinsic aids be given the force of law-rather, legislative history
is simply offered to explain what the law that was passed through the constitu-
tional process means.170 Moreover, this argument fails to explain why dictionar-
ies, whose contents obviously have not satisfied the presentment clause, can be
considered authoritative. 171 Finally, Corbin's realistic insights show that interpre-
tation necessarily depends upon the judge's own background and biases, which
of course have not benefited from bicameralism or presentment either.
To illustrate these points, consider variations on the facts of Nix v. Hedden. 1
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The case raised the question whether a statute that imposed a tariff on imported
West Indian vegetables, but not fruits, applied to tomatoes. The Supreme Court
168. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law
in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875, 895 (1991) (criticizing lack of cooperation
between common law judges and legislators and calling for a "touch of republican dialogue between
Congress and the court"). Cf Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy
in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV. 593, 626 (1993) (describing view that ideal "republican
dialogue" would reach uniquely correct political outcomes and that judges should interpret statutes as if
such a dialogue had taken place).
The leading proponents of a public-spirited legislative-judicial partnership, while unlikely to be
persuaded by a private-law oriented contract model, nonetheless are strong advocates of the use of
legislative history in statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 101, at 633 ("Legislative
history and statutory precedents provide instruction about what the statute is all about and are formal
means by which the text's horizon connects with that of the interpreter"); Macey, supra note 82, at 262
(legislative history should be used by judges to identify public interest underlying legislation and to
hold statute's sponsors to their words, even if insincere, about how statute promotes public interest);
Strauss, supra note 82, at 535 (consultation with political history of legislation necessary "to improve
the chances that the judges' inevitable resolution of 'policy in the gap of ambiguity' would conform to
society's wishes and thus tend toward 'peace in the community' ") (quoting from EDWARD LEVI,
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1 (1948)). Because this article accepts an intentionalist perspective
on statutory interpretation, a discussion of issues involved with the use of legislative history that does
not explain textual provisions but rather provides insight into the broader legislative purposes that
originally lay behind the statutory enactment is beyond its scope.
169. See, e.g., Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co. 116 S. Ct. 637, 645 (1996)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); SCALIA, supra note 1, at 35; Frank H.
Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 445 (1990); Manning,
supra note 5, at 696-97.
170. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 15, at 862-63; Brudney, supra note 81, at 42-45; Eskridge, supra
note 1, at 671-72.
171. See Manning, supra note 5, at 702-05.
172. 149 U.S. 304 (1893).
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applied the canon that statutes should be given their ordinary meaning, and then
held without citation that "in the common language of the people" tomatoes
were considered vegetables, even though botanists viewed them as "fruits of
the vine." 17 3 This case is a classic example of the point that judges necessarily
bring in the extrinsic evidence of their own backgrounds. Suppose, however,
that the committee reports had clearly stated that all terms in the text were
intended to be understood in accordance with their scientific or technical
meaning. One presumes that the Court would have reached the opposite result.
Would it be unconstitutional for the Court to do so?
What makes legislative history reliable evidence of statutory meaning is the
accurate generalization that busy members of Congress defer the crafting of
specific bills to sponsors and committees, and acquiesce in the meaning these
experts attach to the legislation. In a recent article, Professor John Manning
reshapes the New Textualist argument with more precision, arguing that what
distinguishes legislative history from other forms of extrinsic aids (like dictionar-
ies, and, perhaps, although Manning does not address this, like the judges' own
personal background and biases) is that the Constitution prevents "delegation"
of the legislative function to subunits of Congress. Manning's reasoning sug-
gests the following: Congress may properly outlaw "unreasonable" restraints of
trade and may allow judges, using common law techniques, to define reasonable-
ness; they may allow broadcast licenses to be granted "in the public interest"
and allow the Federal Communications Commission to define that term; but
Congress may not allow the Commerce Committee to do either of these
things. 1
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To be sure, the contract analogy may not be persuasive to those who accept
this constitutional argument. The UCC does not prevent courts from examining
the reasons why the parties chose to include particular language in a written
contract; to the contrary, modem contract law permits and enforces oral argu-
ments (subject to the Statute of Frauds). But the concept that judges called upon
to interpret statutes are constitutionally prohibited from considering legislative
history is just as remarkable as the concept that judges interpreting contracts
could never consider the parties' oral statements.
To continue the contract analogy for one moment, consider the constitutional
argument that the presentment clause effectively prescribes a "statute of frauds"
for all legislation. (This is a narrower argument than the one Manning makes,
but effectively illustrates the breadth and difficulty of his argument.) Assume a
written contract for the sale of goods, signed by both parties, that contains no
merger clause or any other manifestation of the parties' intent that the written
contract constitutes a complete integration. Although the statute of frauds would
generally bar parol evidence suggesting that there was an additional or side
agreement relating to the sale of other goods valued at more than $500, judges
173. Id. at 307.
174. See Manning, supra note 5.
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would certainly admit parol evidence concerning the meaning the parties at-
tached to a particular term. Suppose the contract included a clause providing
that, in the event of a contract dispute leading to litigation, the prevailing party
will receive "reasonable" attorneys fees, and that the plaintiff wished to intro-
duce into evidence a letter the defendant wrote prior to signing the contract,
which acknowledges that the parties have agreed to be bound by three federal
district court opinions that define reasonable attorneys fees. Surely, a court
would find this evidence admissible. 
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Professor Manning's thesis, therefore, leaps from the unremarkable proposi-
tion that neither congressional committees (via reports) nor legislative leaders
(via floor colloquies) can make law, to the proposition that legislators cannot
legislate on the assumption that the meanings attached to the text by those most
involved in the legislation are the meanings in which they all acquiesce.
The proposition that Congress can delegate the implementation of its policies
to courts, agencies, or even private parties but not to congressional committees
is controversial enough; 176 the suggestion that Congress can permit judges to
attach their own meaning to text, or can insist that judges defer to the meaning
set by an agency, but that a member of Congress cannot rely on an explanation
of the text's meaning contained in a committee report or provided by the bill's
sponsor is highly problematic. In particular, this constitutional argument runs
into significant difficulty for those starting from the premise that, subject to
specified substantive constitutional constraints, legislation ought to effectuate
the public policy established by elected legislators, and not unelected judges.
Manning's argument is almost overwhelmed by irony-we discover that virtu-
ally all the great Justices throughout our history have not only been acting
unwisely but unconstitutionally by resorting to legislative history, based on a
completely atextual reading of the Constitution relying solely on Manning's
own views of its "structure." 177
Judges and commentators determined to implement their own vision of
society and government's role in society should be comfortable with Manning's
thesis. The formalist bar on extrinsic evidence, requiring legislators to solve
every imaginable interpretive problem in the text or leave it up to judges or
agency heads (who may well be from a different political party), obviously
reflects the New Textualist view of the way the legislative process should work.
The discretion that it gives judges to interpret words according to their own
background and biases will mean that many statutes will be implemented in a
175. Justice Scalia, of course, found that this precise sort of extrinsic evidence should be inadmis-
sible in interpreting statutes. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring),
discussed supra note 70.
176. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985-88 (White, J., dissenting).
177. See Strauss, supra note 82, at 532 (stating that the "idea of instructing or teaching Congress
suggests a hierarchical view quite inappropriate to a government of co-equal branches"); Strauss, supra
note 104, at 255 (indicating that interpretive rules requiring judges to act in ignorance of the context in
which Congress operates are "grounded in disdain for the internal procedures of a coordinate branch").
1998]
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way that reflects the policy preferences of the judiciary more so than the
enacting Congress. Whether one finds the end result desirable depends on the
extent to which the federal judiciary is composed at any given time of men and
women who share one's policy preferences. Whatever the result, it is clearly
one of judicial activism.178
CONCLUSION: WHAT CORBIN'S VICTORY MEANS FOR THE NEW TEXTUALISTS
The successful efforts of Professors Arthur Corbin, Karl Llewellyn, and
others to liberalize the parol evidence rule in interpreting contracts has real
significance in the contemporary debate about the use of legislative history in
statutory interpretation. Starting from a consensus that supports free markets
where parties can effectuate enforceable promises, courts, commentators, and
legislatures adopting the UCC have accepted Corbin's argument that the process
of interpretation must go beyond the words found in any particular writing, and
that the so called "plain meaning" of words cannot be established through
judicially created objective tests. The modem contract law consensus rejects the
view of Professor Samuel Williston that the plain meaning of a writing can and
should be ascertained by the interpreter of that writing without going beyond
the text itself. Without information about the intent of those who authored the
writing, interpretation will necessarily rest upon the subjective views of indi-
vidual judges.
This article suggests that statutory interpretation is analogous to contract
interpretation. Beginning with the paradigm that in a democratic republic,
elected legislators ought to be able to effectuate their policy preferences through
legislation, analysis of the parol evidence rule leads to the conclusion that
judges interpreting statutes without the benefit of legislative history are more
likely to weave their own biases and background into their interpretation than if
they were required to examine and consider reliable evidence of legislative
intent contained in the legislative history. This result is precisely the opposite
from that claimed by New Textualists, and forces judges and commentators who
believe in judicial restraint to carefully reconsider the validity of textualism.
178. See Peter B. Edelman, Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence and the Good Society: Shades of Felix
Frankfurter and the Harvard Hit Parade of the 1950s, 12 CARDozo L. Rev. 1799, 1815 (1991)
(whatever Justice Scalia's protestations, his jurisprudential world is not one of judicial restraint or
legislative supremacy); Strauss, supra note 104, at 264-66 (use of political history to discern legislative
purpose that should be basis of most interpretation "is a useful safeguard against judicial aggrandize-
ment").
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